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ABSTRACT

AN INVESTIGATION OF INTERNAL CONTROL RELATED FRAUDS AND
AUDITOR LITIGATION: PRE- AND POST- SARBANES-OXLEY, SECTION 404
Ifeoma A. Udeh, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Business at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012

Director: Ruth W. Epps, Ph.D.
Professor, Accounting

Using 629 observations of U.S. publicly listed firms with internal control related frauds
from 2000 to 2006; this study investigates the change in auditor litigations in the Post- Sarbanes
Oxley, Section 404 period. To the extent the conditions of the internal control in place are
inadequate or non-existent, the possibility of the occurrence of internal control related fraud
heightens. Thus, the inability of auditors to detect a financial statement misstatement due to
internal control fraud in a timely manner exposes auditors to litigation (Barra, 2010; Heninger,
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2001; Caplan, 1999). This situation was prevalent in the recent notable corporate failures that
resulted in auditors being named as potential defendants.
The present research finding indicates during the Post-SOX 404 period, the probability of
auditor litigation due to internal control fraud increases. However, no support was shown for
further increases in the likelihood of auditor litigation when both types of fraud occur in the PostSOX 404 period. These results suggest an increase in the enforcement of accountability by the
SEC, and should motivate auditors towards reassessing their audit procedures. Furthermore, the
results indicate the probability of auditor litigation due to internal control fraud decreases for
accelerated filers, and similarly, the probability of auditor litigation decreases for firms with
management voluntary disclosures reflecting effective internal control.
The overall result of this study indicates the likelihood of auditors being litigated
increased in the Post-SOX 404 period, and auditors are more likely to be litigated when both
types of fraud occurs simultaneously. This result further supports the argument for meritorious
claims and the procedural justice theory.
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I Introduction

The enactment of Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 was a defining moment in the
history of the accounting profession. SOX 2002 was enacted “to protect investors by improving
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for
other purposes.”1 One of the key requirements to achieve the purpose of SOX 2002 is stated in
Section 404 – Management Assessment of Internal Controls. Section 404(a) of SOX requires the
SEC to prescribe rules requiring that each annual report filed with the SEC under the 1934
Securities Exchange Act shall “contain an internal control report, which shall(1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate
internal control structure and procedures for financial reporting; and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial
reporting” (US Congress, 107 H.R. 3763).
In addition, Section 404(b) specifies,
“With respect to the internal control assessment required by subsection (a), each
registered public accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer
shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer” (US
Congress, 107 H.R. 3763).
Regulators and standard setters have issued various pronouncements with respect to
internal controls. The fundamental of an internal control system was first broadly discussed in
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One hundred seventh congress of the United States of America, at the second session begun and held on the
twenty-third day of January, two thousand and two.
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the 1992 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Report: Internal Control – An
Integrated Framework. The COSO internal control framework consists of five interrelated
components. These are: (1) control environment, (2) risk assessment, (3) control activities, (4)
information and communication, and (5) monitoring (AICPA, 2004). In 2007, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) noted in the Auditing Standard No. 5 (An
Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of
Financial Statements) that the internal control over financial reporting has inherent limitations.
According to the PCAOB, internal control over financial reporting is a process that
involves human diligence and compliance and is subject to lapses in judgment, breakdowns
resulting from human failures, circumvention by collusion or improper management override. In
view of this, the PCAOB requires auditors to consider whether a firm’s internal controls
sufficiently address risk of material misstatement due to fraud and risk of management override
of other controls. Similarly, the America Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) in
Statement of Auditing Standard No. 99 (Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit),
states “the auditor’s interest specifically relates to acts which result in material misstatement of
the financial statements.” Thus, internal control related frauds are expected to give rise to auditor
litigations.
Dye (1993) identifies the violation of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) and the violation of the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) as the two
broad bases under which claims are brought against external auditors. The claims are based upon
gross negligence (Schwartz 1998, Dye 1993). GAAP is the framework for financial accounting,
and it includes standards, rules, and conventions that should be followed in recording
transactions and in preparing financial statements. GAAS are standards against which the quality

2

of audits is assessed. GAAS includes ten auditing standards grouped as either general standards,
standards of fieldwork or standards of reporting. The focuses of these ten standards are closely
related to the requirements of Sarbanes Oxley, 2002, Section 404, to the extent they address the
auditor’s responsibility in relation to issues such as due professional care, internal control, and
disclosures.
Furthermore, the recent events that plagued the accounting profession, involving the now
Big 4 and the then Big 5 audit firms and companies such as Enron, WorldCom and Tyco, raise
concerns about the role of auditors and auditing procedures. Prior literature has suggested a rise
in auditor litigation in periods of instability (Palmrose, 1987). These notable failures in the
corporate environment which were mostly attributable to lack of due professional care would
have been prevented or at least detected and corrected timely. In these recent corporate failures,
auditors were named as potential defendants due to the nature of their role in evaluating the
“substance over form” characteristics of transactions and events, and their role in determining if
such transactions and events are reasonable, fairly recorded, and properly disclosed.
Obtaining an understanding of the nature of transactions including the basis for any
assumptions made about the transaction is one of the fundamentals of designing an audit
procedure. If an auditor’s understanding of a transaction and the elements of the transaction are
flawed, then the auditor will be unable to evaluate appropriately the necessary internal controls
related to the transaction nor will the auditor be able to give a reasonable opinion as to whether
the transaction is valid, verifiable, and performed under an internal control system that operates
effectively.
Prior literatures suggest an inverse relation between fraud and internal control (Barra,
2010; Heninger, 2001; Caplan, 1999). When fraud occurs, it implies an opportunity existed, and
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the opportunity was taken advantage of by the perpetrator(s). The opportunity can be the result of
the absence of internal controls, the ineffectiveness of internal control, or through management
override of internal controls. The interaction between the absence of internal control or the lapse
in internal control, and the occurrence of a fraudulent act that results in material financial
statement misstatement is the focus of interest in this study. As such, this study defines internal
control related fraud as an intentional act which results in a material misstatement in financial
statements under audit, when internal controls are nonexistent or ineffective.2
The auditor has the responsibility to plan (including obtaining an understanding of the
internal controls in place in the organization) and perform an audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatements, whether due
to fraud or error (SAS 99). A material misstatement may not be detected due to the nature of the
audit evidence obtained, the nature of the fraud, and nature of audit procedures performed. An
audit failure resulting from any of the above exposes the auditor to potential litigation. Bonner et
al. (1998), show an increased likelihood of auditors’ litigation when frauds are either of a
common nature (fraud types that occur frequently) or when the fraud relates to fictitious
transactions.
Auditing standards have long recognized the significance of internal control in auditing,
since weak internal controls over financial reporting may result in less reliable financial
information. However, auditors had the option of not relying on internal controls, but rather
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Example of auditor litigation due from internal control related fraud: SEC vs. Frank S. Laforgia, CPA (AAER No.
3027, July 31, 2009). The proceedings relate to improper professional conduct of audits and reviews for the years
ended December 31, 2002, December 31, 2003, and the first three quarters of 2004. Unqualified audit and review
reports were issued despite the fact that Certified Services, Inc.’s financial statements were not presented in
accordance with GAAP. Certified Services, Inc.’s financial condition were artificially and materially inflated
through bogus letters of credit recorded as assets and through the omission of material liabilities [Accessed:
November 27, 2010].
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relying solely on the results from substantive tests. Thus, prior to SOX 2002, the only required
audit procedure related to internal controls was auditors had to obtain an understanding of
clients’ internal controls. Tests of internal controls were necessary only if the auditor decided to
rely on the internal controls. SOX changed the requirements related to internal controls, and
require auditors to attest to the effectiveness of internal controls and to evaluate management’s
assertion about the effectiveness of internal controls. Hence, it is likely the audit approaches for
audit engagements would be substantially different in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX
period (Raghunandan & Rama, 2005). Further, an increase is expected in auditor litigation due to
internal control related fraud in the post SOX 2002, Section 404 period because of: (1) the level
of attention given to SOX 2002 by the regulators, management of publicly listed firms, auditors
(both external and internal), academics and, (2) the requirements of SOX 2002 which suggest
additional audit procedures.
Using a sample of U.S. publicly listed firms with internal control related frauds; this
study investigates the change in auditor litigations, and the association between auditor
litigations and internal control related fraud, during the period 2000 to 2006. In environments
where adequate internal controls are designed, implemented, and are operating effectively,
internal control related fraud can be prevented, or detected and corrected on a timely basis,
during the normal course of activities. If the conditions of the internal control are inadequate or
non-existent, then the possibility of the occurrence of internal control related fraud heightens.
Thus, an auditor’s failure to detect a material financial statement misstatement due to internal
control related fraud in a timely manner exposes the auditor to litigation (Barra, 2010; Heninger,
2001; Caplan, 1999).

5

This study focuses on the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Section 404 which
became effective November 15, 2004. Data of firms that experienced internal control related
fraud was obtained from Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) for the years
2000 through 2006. In general, this study investigates the change in auditor litigation due to
internal control fraud in the post- SOX 404 period.
An investigation of the change in auditor litigation due to internal control related fraud is
important because it indicates how consistently organizations and auditors adhere to the
requirements of SOX 2002, Section 404, especially since SOX 2002 focuses on the needs of the
primary financial report users – the investors, and aims to encourage transparency, timeliness,
and reliability in financial reporting. Instances of auditor litigation due to internal control related
fraud indicate management may not have adequate internal controls in place, or the auditors may
not have exercised due diligence in performing auditing functions. The extent to which
regulators and stakeholders do not bring legal actions against management and auditors, when
stakeholders detrimentally rely on materially misstated financial report, is an indication of the
level of importance attached to accountability, which is emphasized in Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.
The results of this study may be informative to law-makers as they seek to address the ills
that affect the economic sector as a whole and deter undue business practices. To the extent that
investors and the business world perceive value in government’s decisions and involvement in
the business world, policy makers may be faced with less opposition when making enactments
which they presume will encourage good business practices, deter fraudulent practices and
possibly enhance the economic well-being of the nation. Regulators may find it useful since it
may assist in evaluating the effect of SOX 2002, Section 404 on the accounting profession,
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especially since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 amongst other things mandated certain reforms
focused on enhancing corporate responsibilities, financial disclosures, and deterring fraud.
Moreover, the increased emphasis on internal controls by regulatory agencies, by those charged
with governance in corporations, and in audit procedures used by public accountants are due in
part to SOX 2002 (Doyle et al., 2007; Blay, 2005; Ge & McVay, 2005).
External auditors may find this study helpful because the study communicates the need
for adequate attention to fraud and hence, the need to exercise professional skepticism in
considering the risk of material misstatement due to fraud, especially since users of the financial
reports may have a different perception of what the auditors’ responsibilities are with respect to
fraud. Hence, a perceived failure to meet the expectation of stakeholders as it relates to fair
financial reporting and disclosure is expected to result in auditor litigations. McEnroe and
Martens (2001) found in their survey of public accountants and individual investors, to determine
the perception of the extent of expectation gap existence in attest functions, that there exists an
expectation gap between auditors’ responsibilities and stakeholders’ perception of what auditors’
responsibility is. They suggest the expectation gap may explain the reason why some
stakeholders expect auditors to act as “public watch dogs,” which implies that auditors are
expected to have the public interest as a key objective, as opposed to being an advocate of the
client.
This study contributes to the literature on Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 by investigating
the change in auditor litigation due from internal control related fraud. While prior studies have
shown a significant change in accounting practice since the enactment of SOX 2002, the
literature provides limited information on how SOX 2002 affected auditor litigation. This study
investigates internal control related fraud to determine how auditor litigation may have changed
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due to SOX 2002, Section 404 because Section 404 states the responsibilities of management
and auditors with respect to internal control and financial reporting. Though prior studies have
indicated that auditors consider internal control and risk (including litigation risk, fraud risk and
significant risk) in their decisions and audit procedures (Hwang & Chang, 2010; Pratt & Stice,
1994), very little prior research have investigated the effect of SOX 2002 Section 404 on auditor
litigation due internal control related fraud.
Further, unlike prior studies that used the theoretical framework of attribution theory
(Reffett 2007, Bonner et al. 1998), this study also uses a complementary theory, procedural
justice theory. In addition, the 1992 COSO internal control framework and the 2007 PCAOB
internal control regulations are used in framing the theoretical structure of this study. The use of
both theories and the existing regulations as the framework to investigate auditor litigation is a
theoretical contribution to research in auditor litigation. In addition, this study is relevant since
fraud continues to be of mainstream interest considering the recent accounting scandals including
Lehman Brothers, the extent of regulatory involvement, the depth of media coverage, the
economic impact on both Wall Street and Main Street, and the growth in forensic accounting as a
sub-area in the field of accounting (Barra, 2010; Dye, 1993).
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature
addressing internal control related fraud, Sarbanes Oxley Act and auditor litigation. Also, in
chapter 2, the theoretical framework of the study is discussed and the hypotheses are presented.
Chapter 3 describes the methodology, empirical models, and data sources that are used in the
investigation. Chapter 4 presents the results of the analysis and the implications of the results.
Chapter 5 concludes the study and identifies the limitations of the study as well as potential
future research areas.
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II Literature Review and Hypotheses

Background
Several streams of research are primarily relevant to this study. The first stream of
research has examined internal control and frauds. These studies have generally demonstrated
that the quality of firms’ internal control is related to the occurrence of fraud. The second stream
of research relates to auditor litigation. Generally these studies have provided empirical evidence
about auditors’ evaluation of audit risk, which includes litigation risk, and auditors’ response to
the assessed risks, especially as it relates to litigation. The third stream of research relevant to
this study relates to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). These studies examine the effect of
the Sarbanes Oxley Act on various facets of accounting and auditing, and they provide insight
into the requirements of SOX especially as it relates to management’s responsibility and
auditors’ responsibility. The streams of research mentioned above are discussed in detail below
following the discussion on the theoretical framework.

Theoretical Framework
Attribution theory is a social psychology theory concerned with how people interpret
events and behaviors, and how people ascribe causes to the events and behaviors. Research using
attribution theory examines the use of information in the social environment to explain events
and behaviors (Schroth & Shah, 2000). According to Reffett (2007), “when evaluators believe

9

comparable persons would have acted differently in a given circumstance, evaluators tend to
attribute responsibility for an outcome to the person. Conversely, when evaluators believe
comparable persons would have acted similarly, evaluators tend to attribute responsibility for the
outcome to the situation.” The former refers to internal or dispositional attributions, while the
latter refers to external or situational attributions (Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004).
Prior literature (Wilks and Zimbelman, 2004; Schroth & Shah, 2000; Adler 1980) has
shown people are inclined to attribute others’ behavior to dispositional tendencies and to
attribute their own behavior to situational circumstances. This is often true, when the observed
behavior is negative, similar to fraud. Thus, evaluators are expected to infer the failure to detect
internal control related fraud as a dispositional tendency on the auditor’s part. In other words, the
auditors were negligent. Bonner et al. (1998) found that auditors were more likely to be sued
when they fail to detect common frauds, and the evaluators believed that the fraud would have
been detected by other auditors.
Reffett’s (2007) study related to auditor’s accountability for detecting fraud extended
Bonner et. al (1998). Reffett predicted that auditors are more likely to be held accountable by
evaluators when the auditors fail to detect fraud after they had identified the fraud occurrence as
a fraud risk. The result of Reffett’s study shows an increase in auditors’ liability when an audit
fails, after the auditors had identified the perpetrated fraud as a fraud risk and performed
procedures to investigate the identified fraud risk. The findings support Reffett’s prediction.
Auditors are required by Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404 to report on the effectiveness
of firms’ internal control. As such, auditors are expected to gain an understanding of the internal
controls in place, assess the design and implementation of the internal controls and test the
operating effectiveness of the internal controls, as deemed necessary for the auditors’ reliance
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and possibly scaling back of other substantive audit procedures. These processes can be
interpreted by evaluators as a basis to determine negligence, if auditors fail to detect internal
control related fraud, which has occurred.
The procedures used in the evaluation of a legal situation suggest the value perception of
one group about another. Procedural justice theory is a social psychology theory concerned with
decision making process and the impact of the process on social relationship. The theory focuses
on what constitutes fair decision procedures, and is the basis for the practice of decision-makers
to use and apply laws or criteria that they believe are fair, just, and relevant to the decision
making process (Buckless & Peace, 1993).
The value perception may convey positive or negative signals to the group under
scrutiny. These positive or negative signals occur irrespective of the direction of the legal case
(Schroth & Shah, 2000). Thus, external attribution occurs, if an auditor perceives the procedures
as being unfair, and their litigation as negative. Also, there is an indication of external attribution
when the procedures are perceived as being unfair, and being litigated as positive. On the other
hand, an internal attribution is observed when an auditor sees the procedures as being fair, and
their being litigated as positive. Finally, an internal attribution is indicated when an auditor sees
the procedures as being fair, and their being litigated as negative.
Using prior research findings as an indicator, it is expected in a case of an alleged failed
audit, auditors are more likely to be sued. Regulators and investors will most likely be inclined to
attribute the cause of the alleged failed audit to negligence on the part of the auditors, especially
since auditors are mostly sued for meritorious claims (Fureman, 1999), which suggests fair
procedures are followed.
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Internal controls and fraud
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) defines internal control
over financial reporting in Auditing Standard No. 5 (2007) (An Audit of Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements) as a process
designed by, or under the supervision of, the company’s principal executive and principal
financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected by the company’s board
of directors, management, and other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external
purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and includes
those policies and procedures that –
(1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company;
(2) provide reasonable assurance transactions are recorded as necessary to permit
preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles, and receipts and expenditures of the company are being made only in
accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the company; and
(3) provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of
unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of the company’s assets that could have a
material effect on the financial statements.
The PCAOB noted internal control over financial reporting is a process that involves
human diligence and compliance and is subject to lapses in judgment and breakdowns resulting
from human failures. Further, the PCAOB noted internal control over financial reporting can be
circumvented by collusion or improper management override. Hence, internal control over
financial reporting has inherent limitations. As a result of these inherent limitations, there is the
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risk that material misstatements will not be prevented or detected and corrected on a timely basis
by internal control over financial reporting.
Since, these inherent limitations are known features of the financial reporting process, it
is possible to design the process to include safeguards to reduce, though not eliminate, inherent
risk. Thus, auditors are required to consider whether a firm’s internal controls sufficiently
address risk of material misstatement due to fraud and risk of management override of other
controls. This study relates to the risk of material misstatement due to fraud and examines the
change in auditor litigation due to internal control fraud.
The 1992 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) Report: Internal Control – An
Integrated Framework identified the fundamental and essential objectives of any business or
entity as: (1) economy and efficiency of operations, including safeguarding of assets and
achievement of desired outcomes; (2) reliability of financial and management reports; and (3)
compliance with laws and regulations (AICPA, 2004). The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations’
(COSO) internal control framework provided guidance on critical aspects of organizational

governance and internal control. The COSO internal control framework consists of five
interrelated components. These five components are: (1) control environment, (2) risk
assessment, (3) control activities, (4) information and communication, and (5) monitoring. All
the components except control activities operate at the entity level. COSO defines these
components as below:
“Control environment sets the tone of an organization, influencing the control
consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for all other components of internal
control, providing discipline and structure.
Risk assessment is the entity’s identification and analysis of relevant risks to achievement
of its objectives, forming a basis for determining how the risks should be managed.
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Control activities are the policies and procedures that help ensure that management
directives are carried out.
Information and communication systems support the identification, capture, and
exchange of information in a form and time frame that enable people to carry out their
responsibilities.
Monitoring is a process that assesses the quality of internal control performance over
time.” (AICPA, 2004)
Prior studies have recognized internal control over financial reporting as an important
element of a firm’s structure and much attention has been given to internal controls by
regulators, standard-setters, management and auditors, since the recent events that plagued the
accounting profession. Research on internal control and fraud has focused on the nature of firms
that motivate fraud occurrences and the implications of fraud occurrences for auditors.
Discussions of these prior studies on the nature of firms most likely to experience fraud and the
fraud types are presented below.
Nature of firms
Every firm is susceptible to fraud because every fraud involves humans. However, certain
characteristics may make a firm more vulnerable to fraud than another firm without those
characteristics. Prior literature has investigated these characteristics that make firms vulnerable
to fraud by studying fraud and non-fraud firms and determining what they have in common and
what may be peculiar to each group. Ziegenfuss (1996) in a survey with 145 respondents
identified the following as the reasons for increased fraud: (1) poor management practices, (2)
economic pressure, (3) weakened societal values, (4) people not held responsible for actions, (5)
inadequate training for those responsible for fraud prevention /detection, (6) more sophisticated
criminals, (7) advances in computer technology, (8) increased workloads, (9) ineffective justice

14

system (10) reduction of middle management (11) other, and (12) lack of government
intervention.
With respect to the control environment, firms that have well established structures and
the proper tone at the top are less vulnerable to fraud. This argument is supported by literature
such as Abbott (2000) and Bell & Carcello (2000). Abbott investigated whether audit committee
activity and independence is inversely related to fraudulent financial statements, using 156 firms
subject to SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcements Releases (AAERs) between 1980 and
1986. In the study, Abbott substituted the variable audit committee presence used in earlier
studies with audit committee activity and independence, since the earlier studies reported mixed
results about the association of audit committee and likelihood of fraud. Abbott (2000) results
indicate that firms with independent directors and with the minimum activity level are less likely
to be associated with fraudulent financial statements.
Bell & Carcello (2000) used a sample of 77 fraud and 305 non-fraud engagements to
examine the probability of fraudulent financial reporting conditioned on the presence or absence
of 46 fraud risk factors. Bell & Carcello (2000), in addition to identifying specifically weak
control environment as a factor that increases the probability of financial reporting fraud, also
identified the following factors as being effective in discriminating fraudulent financial
reporting: (1) rapid growth, (2) management’s overly concern with meeting projected earnings,
(3) overly evasive management, (4) ownership status, and (5) interaction between weak control
environment and aggressive financial reporting attitude.
Doyle et al. (2007) narrowed their research focus to material weaknesses, which is the
most extreme category of flaws possible in an internal control system. The other two categories
are significant deficiencies and deficiencies (Auditing Standard No. 5). The results reported by
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Doyle et al. in their examination of 779 firms that disclosed material weakness from August
2002 to 2005 are very similar to the results reported by Bell & Carcello (2000). Doyle et al.
(2007) found the firms that disclosed material weaknesses: (1) were smaller in size, (2)
experienced financial difficulties and were thus less profitable, (3) had more complex structures,
(4) experienced rapid growth, or (5) were undergoing some form of restructuring. According to
Doyle et al., the characteristics of these firms were consistent with firms that have difficulties
with financial reporting controls, lacked resources, had complex accounting issues and exist in a
rapidly changing business environment.
The aforementioned studies have more or less identified control environment as being
important. Unlike the previous studies mentioned, which examined the control environment,
Barra (2010) focused on control activities and monitoring. Barra used an analytical approach to
investigate the effect of penalties and other internal controls on employees’ propensity to be
fraudulent. Barra used both managerial and non-managerial employees, and found the presence
of the control activities, separation of duties, increases the cost of committing fraud. This
implies that the benefit from committing fraud has to outweigh the cost in an environment of
segregated duties for an employee to commit fraud. Further, Barra found segregation of duties is
a ‘least-cost’ fraud deterrent for non-managerial employees, but for managerial employees,
maximum penalties are the ‘least-cost’ fraud disincentives. The results suggest the effectiveness
of preventive controls (control activities) such as segregation of duties is dependent on detective
controls (monitoring).
In general, prior studies suggest an ineffective internal control system is a key feature in
fraud firms. Therefore, this study argues that the responsibility for the outcome of internal
control related frauds are more likely to be attributed to a person (e.g. auditors) than to a
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situation since evaluators would most likely believe that comparable persons would have acted
differently given the circumstances.
Effect on auditors
Literature has shown there is an association between internal control and fraud. The
attribution theory has suggested that when fraud occurs, identified parties are held accountable.
Auditors by reason of their role as “public watch dogs” (McEnroe and Martens, 2001) are most
likely to be held accountable if evaluators determine substandard audit services were provided
(Bonner et al., 1998; Reffett, 2007).
Using a sample of 261 firms subject to SEC enforcement actions between 1982 and 1995,
Bonner et al. (1998) investigate whether the likelihood of auditor litigation increased with certain
types of financial reporting frauds. Bonner et al. developed a fraud taxonomy which includes the
following categories: (a) fictitious revenues, (b) premature revenue recognition, (c)
misclassifications, (d) fictitious assets and/ or reductions of expenses/liabilities, (e) overvalued
assets and undervalued expenses/ liabilities, (f) omitted or undervalued liabilities (affecting
expenses or assets), (g) omitted or improper disclosures, (h) equity frauds, (i) related party
transactions, (j) frauds going the “wrong way” (those understating income and / or assets), (k)
illegal acts, and (l) miscellaneous (including consolidation issues). Bonner et al. investigated the
independent variables – frequent fraud and fictitious transaction frauds. They found there is more
likelihood of auditor litigation due to frequent frauds than fictitious transaction frauds.
Similarly, the results of two experiments reported by Reffett (2007) support the notion
that auditors are possible parties to be held accountable in instances of internal control fraud.
Reffett (2007) conducted two experiments using a total of 280 non-accounting major
undergraduate students as participants to investigate the likelihood of auditors being held
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responsible to detect fraud under three conditions of a perpetrated fraud: (1) fraud risk not
identified and no targeted audit procedures performed, (2) fraud risk identified and no targeted
audit procedures, and (3) fraud risk identified and targeted audit procedures performed. The
results of both experiments indicate that auditors in the first condition were less likely to be held
liable for losses, while auditors in the third condition were most likely to be held liable for
losses. The results were consistent with attribution and norm theory which Reffett used in
developing the theoretical framework of the study. The results reported suggest a possible
increase in auditor’s liability when fraud risks are identified and can be easily investigated versus
when fraud risks are more difficult to investigate.
Further, Johnson & Rudesill (2001), through a survey of 171 accountants to determine
within the context of small businesses, the issues of fraud, fraud prevention and detection
procedures used, and the perceived impact of SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit, found the majority of respondents believe management is responsible
for fraud prevention, and an auditor’s responsibility entails assessing fraud risk and designing the
audit procedures accordingly. Also, majority of the respondents believe the frequency of
occurrence of fraud depends on the effectiveness of the internal control system and the extent of
monitoring by management.
In general, the studies conducted by Bonner et al. (1998), Reffett (2007) and Johnson &
Rudesill (2001) suggest (1) a negative association between internal control and fraud, (2)
auditors are possible defendants in instances of internal control fraud; (3) the chances of auditors
being litigated increases when the frauds are of the frequent type in nature; and (4) the chances
of auditors being litigated increases when the identified fraud risks can easily be investigated.
The following studies investigated the effect internal control frauds have on auditors.
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These studies suggest that auditors respond to identified flaws in internal control by adjusting the
nature of the audit tests applied. Matsumura & Tucker (1992) used game-theory analysis and an
economic experiment to investigate the effect of: (1) auditor’s penalty due from reputation loss
and monetary loss from failure to detect fraud, (2) auditing standard requirements that auditors
detect fraud or other irregularities, (3) the quality of the internal control structure, and (4) audit
fee, on (1) tests of transactions and detailed tests of balances, (2) fraud detection, and (3)
incidence of fraud. Matsumura & Tucker found auditors increased tests of transactions, and did
not increase tests of fraud, when they assessed the strength of the internal control as high, and by
so doing, auditors detected fraud more frequently, which in turn led to less fraud from
management. The results suggest the existence of a direct relationship between testing, fraud
detection, and fraud prevention. And the results further show auditors react to the possibility of
internal control fraud by adjusting their substantive test approach to address the outcome of their
internal control assessment, just as Caplan (1999) suggested the strength of a firm’s internal
control system should be a “red flag” in the fraud risk assessment.
Similarly, Caplan (1999) examined an auditor’s decision to investigate for fraud, when a
manager has an incentive to misstatement financial information by choosing the weak internal
controls. Caplan argued “internal controls are assumed to help prevent and detect unintentional
errors and employee wrongdoing, but they do not directly deter management fraud.” Caplan
further argued a weak internal control system is more prone to errors thus increasing the
probability that error will be the cause of an audit exception. In view of these, Caplan reported
that when the potential for management override of controls is high irrespective of the strength
of the internal control system, it may be rational for auditors to focus more on identifying errors,
and not audit precisely for fraud.
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In deciding the substantive test approach to apply, auditors consider the possible varieties
of irregularities. Matsumura & Tucker (1992) identified these as defalcations (misappropriations
of assets) and fraud (misrepresentation of fact). Caplan (1999) identified the latter as intentional
noncompliance with regulatory requirements. This study discusses below, fraud types, from a
regulatory perspective and from a practical perspective.
Fraud Types
The Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 99 (Consideration of Fraud in a
Financial Statement Audit) identified misstatements due from fraudulent financial reporting and
misappropriation of assets as misstatements (AICPA, 2002; Bell & Carcello, 2000) relevant to
auditors in their consideration of fraud. SAS No. 99 indicated fraudulent financial reporting can
be accomplished by:
a)

Manipulation, falsification, or alteration of accounting records or supporting
documents from which financial statements are prepared.

b)

Misrepresentation in or intentional omission from the financial statements of
events, transactions, or other significant information.

c)

Intentional misapplication of accounting principles relating to amounts,
classification, manner or presentation, or disclosure.

Ziegenfuss (1996) provided every day examples of how the fraudulent financial reporting
can occur. Through a survey of 145 respondents, Ziegenfuss identified 14 fraud types based on
number of occurrences. These are: (1) misappropriation of funds (2) theft (3) expense account
(4) false invoices (5) other false representation (6) kickbacks (7) credit card (8) cheque forgery
and counterfeiting (9) manipulation of cheques (10) medical / insurance claim (11) accounts
receivable manipulation (12) false financial statements (13) phantom vendors and (14) other.
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Further, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) has shown
misappropriation of assets occurs frequently (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2004,
2006, 2010). In the 2004 “Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse,” about 90%
of the fraud cases examined in their survey relate to misappropriation of asset, and included
unrecorded sales, understated sales and fictitious expenses. ACFE also found, though
misappropriation of assets was most common, the median loss associated with misappropriation
of assets was ninety three thousand dollars ($93,000). Likewise, in the similar report for 2006 by
ACFE, the proportion of misappropriation of assets was about 91.5% of fraud cases examined,
and the median loss associated with misappropriation of assets was one hundred and fifty
thousand dollars ($150,000). However, in the 2004 report, financial reporting fraud consisted of
about 7.9% of the fraud cases and had a median loss of one million dollars ($1,000,000).
Similarly, in the 2006 report, financial reporting fraud was about 10.6% of the fraud cases and
had a median loss of two million dollars ($2,000,000).
This trend is also notable in the 2010 “Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and
Abuse.” ACFE found approximately 90% of the fraud cases examined relate to misappropriation
of assets, and less than 5% of the cases were financial reporting fraud. Moreover, the median loss
associated with misappropriation of assets was hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) in the 2010
report, and the median loss for financial reporting fraud was one million, seven hundred and
thirty thousand dollars ($1,730,000) in the 2010 report.
Financial reporting fraud is often related to management level fraud, and
misappropriation of assets is often associated with fraud at the employee level (Choo & Tan,
2007; AICPA 2002; Johnson & Rudesill, 2001). The occurrence of the situations which prior
literature identified as being associated with the quality of internal control and auditor litigation
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are traceable to the factors of financial reporting fraud identified by SAS 99. For instance, fraud
relates to manipulation of transaction supporting documents, earnings management relates to
misrepresentation of significant information, while financial restatements which are not due to
error relate to intentional misapplication of accounting principles (Caplan, 1999). The results
reported by the ACFE show even though financial reporting fraud occurred fewer times than
misappropriation of assets, financial reporting fraud involved much higher dollar amounts. This
suggests that auditors are more likely to be exposed to litigation due from financial reporting.
Since Bonner et al. (1999), found the likelihood of auditor litigation increases when frauds are
frequent in nature, this study argues that auditor litigation is likely to increase further in the
presence of misappropriation of assets, which are frequent in nature.
In the Statement of Auditing Standard No. 99 (Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit), the America Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) stated, “fraud
is a broad legal concept and auditors do not make legal determinations of whether fraud has
occurred. Rather, the auditor’s interest specifically relates to acts that result in material
misstatement of the financial statements.” SAS 99 defined fraud as “an intentional act that results
in a material misstatement in financial statements that are the subject of an audit” (SAS 99 Para.
.05). When fraud occurs, three conditions are generally present. These conditions are: (1)
incentive or pressure to commit fraud; (2) opportunity to commit fraud; (3) rationalization or
attitude towards fraud.
The above suggests that fraud is not an infrequent event, and when fraud occurs, an
existing opportunity was taken advantage of by the perpetrator(s). The opportunity to commit
fraud can be motivated by: (1) the absence of internal controls, (2) the ineffectiveness of internal
control, or (3) management override of internal controls. The interaction between the absence of
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internal control or the lapse in internal control, and the occurrence of a fraudulent act that results
in material financial statement misstatement is the focus of interest in this study (AICPA, 2002).
As such, this study defines internal control related fraud as an intentional act which results in a
material misstatement in financial statements under audit, when internal controls are nonexistent
or ineffective.

Auditor litigation
The previous discussions have shown flaws in the internal control system can result in
fraud, and since auditors are required, and perform procedures involving internal controls,
auditors are more likely to be named as defendants. Hence, a concern is, whether naming
auditors as defendants and whether the outcomes of such actions (e.g. claims, and penalty fees)
are justifiable. In the following section, this study reviews prior studies on auditor litigation
which address issues of ‘meritorious and non-meritorious’ claims against independent auditors,
the basis of auditor litigations, the conditions that motivate auditor litigations, and the effect of
auditor litigations.
Meritorious and non-meritorious’ claims
In the past, there were concerns about auditors being named as defendants without merit
in cases involving financial statements (Kinney, 1993; Palmrose, 1997; Fureman, 1997). This
concern has over the years been alleviated through changes in regulations. Below is a discussion
of prior literature that investigated issues about meritorious and non-meritorious claims against
auditors. Alexander (1991) argues against non-merit litigations and their lack of substance.
Alexander examined securities class actions involving initial public offering (IPOs) of computer
and computer-related firms during the first six months of 1983, and determined the cases ended
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as settlements, and, none were resolved through trials. As such, Alexander stated non-merit
litigations, which tend to follow the path of settlements, as opposed to trials, are motivated by
structural characteristics, which include the procedural legal rules, the contractual and
institutional relationships among the parties, and the economic incentive of the parties
concerned.
In the quest to determine if auditors were litigated non-meritoriously, Kinney (1993)
developed a framework of “auditor’s liability causal links in auditing.” Kinney suggested
substandard audit and substandard financials lead to substandard audited financials. Moreover,
the substandard audited financials, in the presence of other causes of value decline result in a
decline in investment value. Further, Kinney suggested when an investor invests in a firm based
on the information obtained from the substandard audited financials and on influences of other
causes of investment, the investment will result in a loss to the investor who relied on the audited
financials. Kinney implicitly stated auditors were named as defendants when substandard audits
were performed, and investors incurred losses as a result of using information reported in
substandard audited financials.
Palmrose (1997) extended the work of Kinney (1993) by identifying three elements of
meritorious claims against independent auditors. These elements are substandard financial
statements, substandard audits, and compliance with relevant legal standards. According to
Palmrose, the two elements substandard audits and substandard financial statements are explicit
in Kinney (1993)’s framework. However, the element, compliance with relevant legal standards,
“is reflected in a number of the remaining sections of the flowchart (either explicitly or
implicitly).” Palmrose explained detrimental reliance is required legally before claims against
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independent auditors can be enforced. However, she indicated the proof of detrimental reliance
can be implied.
The third element, compliance with relevant legal standards, identified by Palmrose
(1997) extends the issue concerning auditor litigation, beyond securities class actions. This
element suggests auditors can be named as defendants by regulators too, when they fail to
comply with relevant regulations. In this vein, Fureman (1997) tested empirically the theoretical
model developed by Kinney (1993). Fureman used 476 private securities lawsuits relating to
financial disclosures which occurred between May 1992 and November 1997. The constructs in
Kinney (1993) study were proxied using the auditor being named a defendant in a private
securities class action, SEC enforcement actions against auditors, SEC enforcement actions
against management, bankruptcy, restatement of annual financial statements, and length of class
action. Fureman’s results suggest a positive and significant relationship between the
independent variables and dependent variable (auditor being named a defendant). As such, the
result of Fureman’s (1997) empirical analysis supports Kinney’s (1993) theoretical framework.
Further, Fureman (1999) used 446 class actions from April 1992 to April 1995 to
investigate whether nonculpable auditors were habitually named defendants in class actions.
Fureman defined litigation as “a quality control mechanism that discourages the performance of
substandard auditing services.” Fureman argued litigation has to possess some element of
accuracy for it to function effectively. However, Fureman acknowledged due to uncertainty and
the lack of perfect information, a perfectly accurate auditor liability system is unattainable. The
theoretical constructs used in the analysis were auditor culpability, management culpability, and
nonculpability. The constructs were proxied as the variables SEC enforcement actions against
auditors, SEC enforcement actions against management, bankruptcy, restatement of annual and
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quarterly financial statements, and length of class action. The result of the empirical analysis
suggests auditors were not habitually named as defendants in securities class actions.
Hence, these studies indicate auditors are named defendants when they perform
substandard audit services including when they fail to adhere to established regulations. Further,
they suggest both investors and regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) can name auditors as defendants. Moreover, the motivation for either group is different.
For investors, the primary motivation is usually to recoup their investment losses, whereas for
the SEC, their motivations include investor protection, accountability and enforcement of
established regulations.
Basis of auditor litigations
Based on prior literature, auditors are being named as defendants mostly on justifiable
basis, which is failure to adhere to relevant legal standards. In this section, this study discusses
prior literature that identifies what these relevant legal standards are for auditors.
Dye (1993) showed the increasing quantity and quality of the accounting standards may
have an adverse effect on audit quality. According to Dye, claims against independent auditors
arise due to either a departure from auditing procedures as prescribed by the Generally Accepted
Auditing Standards (GAAS) or a departure from accounting and reporting procedures and
practices as prescribed in the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Dye claims
audit quality is unobservable for firms that have no legal issues due from financial matters.
However, audit quality becomes public information when legal actions relating to financial
matters are brought against a firm by its stakeholder, and when stakeholders have a prima facie
case of negligence against the independent auditors.
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Further, Schwartz (1998) showed in a situation of vague negligence, an auditor’s effort
increased with increasing standard requirements. The auditors can escape claims against them,
by attaining the level of quality required by the accounting standards. Schwartz suggests
auditor’s liability may also be determined based on a negligence rule with a vague specification
of due care, in addition to clear negligence and strict liability. Schwartz argues that standards and
regulations relating to negligence are mostly generic due to cost and possibility of endless
scenarios or audit cases. Schwartz suggests the effort required of an auditor under vague
negligence is lower than the effort required under clear negligence, since the lower boundary on
due care is the auditing standards. Schwartz defined the level of due care as “that effort level,
which defines the minimum care an auditor is required to exercise in order to avoid liability.”
Dye (1993) and Schwartz (1998) suggest that the relevant legal standards for auditors are
the accounting standards, specifically, the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and
to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). However, the issue of due care is not
restricted to the GAAS and to the GAAP, as discussed by Dye (1993) and Schwartz (1998). Due
care applies to every standard and regulation that independent auditors are expected and required
to comply with and adhere to, including the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. Thus,
by specifying any standard or regulation, the independent auditor increases his or her expected
liability at any audit effort level which is lower than the specified standard or regulation. Thus,
an independent auditor is expected to increase his or her incentive to expend more audit effort
than would be optimal in the absence of a standard or regulation (Schwartz, 1998).
Conditions that motivate auditor litigations
Failure to comply with GAAS and GAAP were noted in prior research as the main bases
for auditor litigation. However, not all stakeholders know or understand the requirements of
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GAAS, GAAP and other legal requirements such as Sarbanes Oxley Act. Hence, this study
presents below a discussion of prior literature addressing the conditions stakeholders observe,
and which in turn motivate auditor litigations.
St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) analyzed 334 alleged errors found in the 129 cases filed
against public accountants during the period 1960 to 1976, to investigate trends in the nature and
characteristics of the cases. They found: (1) the interpretation of accounting principles and
auditing standards was more of a problem than procedural matters; (2) plaintiffs were motivated
to initiate an error search by signals from the firm or situational characteristics of the firm or the
firm industry; (3) legal risk for public accountants increased in situations where the public
accountants dealt with new clients (three years or less); (4) certain industries are more prone to
legal issues; (5) there were disproportionately more public companies in the cases analyzed; and
(6) a lack of the application of the principle of conservatism was apparent.
Palmrose (1987) examined 472 legal cases involving the 15 largest audit firms from 1960
– 1985. The study investigated the effect of management fraud and business failures on the
litigations against independent auditors. Palmrose states “litigation against independent auditors
takes place in the context of allegations of an audit failure, a situation in which an independent
auditor either fails to detect or detects, but fails to report material omissions or misstatements of
financial information.” Additionally, Palmrose found, (a) auditor litigation relates to the business
climate, such that periods of economic downturns motivate increases in auditor litigations; (b)
auditor litigation is likely in cases of business failures or firms facing extreme financial
difficulties; (c) most bankruptcy legal cases also involved management fraud; (d) management
fraud was present in many of the litigation cases; (e) cases which involved management fraud
were mostly resolved via large payment of damages by the independent auditors; (f) business
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failure cases without management fraud mostly resulted in the dismissal of the case against the
auditor; and (g) cases resolved via damage payments by auditors are more popular in the media,
in comparison to cases which result in a dismissal of legal actions against the auditors.
Carcello and Palmrose (1994) examined 655 bankruptcy firms between 1972 and 1992
with Big Six (Big Eight) auditors prior to bankruptcy, to determine whether auditors who issued
modified audit reports prior to the bankruptcy were protected from legal liability. In their model,
client financial condition is used to capture the presence or absence of the ‘surprise factor’ to
financial statement users. They found auditors were defendants in the majority of the litigation
cases due to bankruptcy and irregularities in financial reporting. Also, Carcello and Palmrose
(1994) found net income and enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) were variables associated with auditor litigation. Further, Carcello and Palmrose found the
bankruptcy legal cases had more auditor payment resolutions than auditor dismissals. Thus, they
suggested the popular belief that auditors are “deep pockets” may explain their finding,
especially since the bankrupt firm has no resources.
Palmrose and Scholz (2000) examined 416 restatement observations from 1995 to June
1999, to determine the relation between financial statement restatement and auditor litigation.
They classify restatements as economic restatements and technical restatements. The
classification does not involve categorization based on management intentionality (fraud or
error). However, these are included as control variables with other control variables such as
auditor type and financial condition. Palmrose and Scholz found auditor litigation was more
likely with economic restatements than with technical restatements, in all restatements (interim
and annual) and in annual restatements alone. Also, they found economic restatements were
more severe, and were associated with client conditions such as fraud and bankruptcy.
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Heninger (2001) examined the relation between earnings management and auditor
litigation using 67 firms with alleged misstatements from 1969 to 1998. Heninger measures
earnings management abnormal accruals and controls for auditor, financial condition, firm size,
and industry. Heninger found auditor litigation has a positive relation with income increasing
abnormal accruals. The result indicates auditors are held responsible for not limiting
management’s earnings manipulation activities that result in an unfair presentation of the
financial statements. Heninger also found auditor litigation is higher when the firms are large in
size and when the firms have weak financial conditions.
From the studies above, certain conditions were noted that motivate auditor litigation.
The conditions are newness of client, industry, conservatism, economic conditions, bankruptcy,
weak financial conditions, irregularities in financial reporting, and restatements. These are some
of the conditions that stakeholders observe before they initiate a process to establish audit failure,
which if established will most likely lead to auditor litigation.
Effect of auditor litigations
The above section presents a discussion of prior literatures that investigated the
conditions that motivate auditor litigations. Below, this study reviews literatures that have
indicated how auditors respond to the possibility of being litigated. These studies suggest
auditors respond to the possibility of being litigated by trying to meet the minimum
requirements, by withdrawing from services assessed to be high risk, by assessing more strictly
firm aggressive practices, and by issuing modified opinions.
Kothari et al. (1988) examined the effects of increased auditor liability. They
decomposed the changes in auditors’ liability into changes in the set of people with basis to file
claim against the auditor, changes in burden of proof against the auditor, and changes in level of
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damages against the auditor, and then analyzed the effect of these three changes on auditors’
liability. Kothari et al. identified over fifteen events from Pre-1933 to 1985 that most likely
caused changes in the frequency of lawsuits against auditors. The major events include the
Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Rule 10b-5 passed in 1942. Kothari et al. suggest increased auditors’ liability
could result in reduced public disclosure of some information, which in turn could have an
overall effect on the value of public information. Therefore, increase in auditor liability might be
a disincentive for auditors and management, to provide useful information to investors, and an
incentive to provide the disclosures mandated by standards.
Pratt & Stice (1994) investigated via a field experiment involving 243 audit partners and
managers, the relation between auditor judgment of litigation risk and client characteristics, in
the auditor’s determination of the preliminary audit plan and client fees. The result indicates the
client’s overall financial condition is the auditor’s primary consideration in the assessment of
their litigation risk. The result shows auditors assess the risk of litigation as high when potential
clients have poor financial conditions.
Shu (2000) examined 247 firms with auditor resignations from 1987 to 1996 to
investigate two explanations of auditor resignations: litigation risk and clientele adjustment. Shu
found that increase in auditor litigation risk is positively related to the likelihood of the auditor
dropping the client. Shu also found the market responds negatively to auditor resignation due to
litigation risk, and the extent to which a firm’s stock prices declines is inversely related to the
severity of the litigation risk.
Chang & Hwang (2003) used an experiment involving 55 audit seniors and managers to
examine the effects of client retention incentive and client business risks on auditors’ decision
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about client’s aggressive practices. Firm financial performance, meeting of market’s earnings
expectation, ability to meet financial obligations, and the litigious environment of the client’s
industry were the indicators used to determine client business risk. They found an inverse
relation between client business risk and auditors’ decisions. The result shows auditors are more
likely to evaluate more thoroughly a client’s aggressive accounting and reporting practices when
the client’s business risks are high. The findings suggest business risks related to potential
litigation is expected to result in decrease in auditors’ willingness to accept aggressive
accounting and reporting practices.
Blay (2005), through an experiment involving 48 audit managers, examined the effect of
independence threats and litigation risk on auditors’ evaluation of information and auditors’
reporting choices. Blay found auditors faced with high litigation risk evaluated information as
more indicative of going concern, and they were more likely to suggest a modified audit report.
The auditor’s evaluation of information they gathered tended towards the less favorable audit
report choice from the client’s perspective. The results suggest changes in regulation and
standards may affect the process by which auditors evaluate evidential support.
Krishnan and Zhang (2005) examined 4,351 firms from the first quarters of 2000 and
2001, to determine the relation between auditor litigation risk and the decision to attach review
report in quarterly filings. They control for factors, such as, auditor type and company size, and
find the decision to attach review report in quarterly filings is associated with auditor type and
company size. Krishnan and Zhang also found auditor litigation risk is negatively related to the
decision to attach review report in quarterly filings. This result according to Krishnan and Zhang
suggest that litigation risk maybe a significant consideration in the decision to attach review
report in quarterly filings.
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The concern regarding most of the auditors’ responses to the possibility of being litigated
as identified above relate to their focus on the “end-result” e.g. withdrawal, modified opinion.
However, as noted above, auditors are litigated mostly for substandard audits not necessarily
because of the “end-results.” For instance, it is not a question of assessing more strictly firm
aggressive practices, it is what auditors do (e.g. communicating to audit committee) after this
assessment is completed that really matters. Thus, even the response of meeting the minimum
requirement at times may not be sufficient to avoid being litigated.

Sarbanes Oxley Act, Section 404
Pre-Sarbanes Oxley Act
Prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, was the sole statutory regulation for internal control over SEC
registrants, and the SEC registrants were only required to make public disclosure of significant
internal control deficiencies, when disclosing auditor change in the Form 8-K (SEC, 1988).
According to McConnell & Banks (2003), “the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 requires
all public companies to devise and maintain a system of internal controls to provide reasonable
assurance assets are safeguarded and transactions properly authorized and recorded.
Consequently, many public companies already have various forms of controls
documentation such as policy manuals, accounting manuals, memorandums, flowcharts, decision
tables and questionnaires. However, few have comprehensively and consistently documented and
evaluated controls to the extent necessary to provide an assertion about their effectiveness.”
Internal control was not introduced under Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; however, SOX expanded
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the reach of the earlier regulations that addressed internal control and explicitly addressed the
issues of roles, requirements and responsibility.
Prior studies conducted using pre-SOX data suggest the control environment of a firm
affects the firm’s operations and the possibility for internal control fraud. Daily & Dalton (1994)
examined the relationship between governance structures (governance structures relate to the
control environment of a firm) and bankruptcy. The study used matched pair design of 57
bankrupt firms from 1972 to 1982. They found a higher likelihood of bankrupt firms having
CEOs who also served as board chairpersons. Additionally, they found bankrupt firms had
higher proportions of affiliated directors. These results suggest a relationship between
governance structures and bankruptcy.
Similarly, using a matched pair sample of 133 alleged fraud cases from 1978 and 2001;
Uzun et al. (2004) investigated the relationship between board characteristics and corporate
fraud. They found the presence of independent directors had an inverse relation with fraud
occurrence and corporate wrongdoing. Uzun et al. found more specifically, the presence of
independent committees such as the audit committee had an inverse relation with fraud
occurrence. The result thus suggests the composition of the board and the structure of
committees are related to occurrence of corporate fraud. The results of Uzun et al. (2004) study,
similar to the study conducted by Daily & Dalton (1994), have some implications for the control
environment and monitoring element in the internal control structure of firms.
Krishnan (2005) investigated the association between the quality of audit committees and
the quality of internal controls. The sample used included 128 companies that changed auditors
over the period 1994-2000. The results show audit committees that are independent and have
financial expertise are significantly less likely to be associated with internal control shortfalls.
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Krishnan also found management’s disposition to fraud was associated with internal controls
problems. However, external auditors are not consistently associated with the quality of internal
controls. The results further show internal control problems are more severe in situations of fraud
and significant financial difficulties. More so, the Big 5 (presently, Big 4) firms are more likely
to be associated with material weaknesses in internal control than with reportable conditions.
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) investigated the economic factors that expose a firm to
internal control risk and the incentives that motivate management to identify and report the
internal control deficiencies. The study used 585 disclosures of internal control deficiencies preSOX 404 periods. The results show firms that reported internal control deficiencies had more
complex operations, were growing faster than comparative firms and had difficult financial
conditions. Also the result show the firms with internal control deficiencies experienced higher
auditor change, had prior SEC enforcement actions, restatements, had more centralized
ownership and were audited by larger audit firms. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) also show these
factors were associated with the firm’s incentive to report internal control deficiencies.
Post-Sarbanes Oxley Act
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) reinforced and extended the reach of the
requirements of the prior regulations such as FCPA 1977, which dealt with internal controls.
Sarbanes Oxley Act, Section 404 states management of an issuer, has the responsibility to
establish, and to maintain an adequate internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting. Further, Section 404 states management has the responsibility to report on their
assessment of the effectiveness of the internal control structure and the procedures for financial
reporting. Disclosures about internal controls was one of the major requirements of SOX, and
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this study discusses below, research that used post-SOX data in the investigation of internal
control disclosures and its effect on auditors.
Ge & McVay (2005) examined 261 firms with material weakness disclosures from
August 2002 to November 2004, to determine the specific types of material weaknesses in
internal control over financial reporting and the characteristics of the firms associated with
material weakness disclosures. They obtained the sample of their study from EDGAR and
Compliance Week. Ge & McVay found material weaknesses were associated with account
specific matters (mostly accrual accounts), training, accounting policies, revenue recognition,
segregation of duties, account reconciliation, subsidiary specific matters, senior management,
and technology issues. Ge & McVay also found firms disclosing material weaknesses had more
complex operations, the firms were smaller in size, the firms had less profitability, and the firms
were mostly audited by the larger audit firms. Ge & McVay suggest, since the large audit firms
tend to have more exposure to litigation, the audit firms might have been more diligent in their
audit procedures which identified the material weaknesses.
Similarly, Zhang et al. (2007) examined the association between audit committee quality,
auditor independence, and the disclosure of material weakness, using a matched pair sample of
208 firms with material weakness disclosures between November 15, 2004 and July 31, 2005.
The results show a higher likelihood of internal control weakness when firms have audit
committees with less financial expertise. Also, Zhang et al. found a higher likelihood of internal
control weakness when auditors are more independent, and a higher likelihood of internal control
weakness for firms that changed auditors.
Further, Krishnan & Visvanathan (2007) examined the relation between the
characteristics of audit committees and auditors, and the disclosure of material weakness, using a
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matched pair sample of 90 firms with material weakness disclosures between November 15,
2004 and March 1, 2005. They control for restatements, CFO experience, profitability,
complexity, growth and organizational changes. Krishnan & Visvanathan found firms that
reported internal control weaknesses experienced higher auditor changes and a greater incident
of restated financial statements.
The results reported by Ge & McVay (2005), Zhang et al. (2007) Krishnan &
Visvanathan (2007) support the earlier findings about the nature of firms with internal control
related fraud. The results reported by Ge & McVay (2005) also suggest auditors responded to the
requirements of SOX by enhancing their audit procedures. Raghunandan & Rama (2006) and
Hogan & Wilkins (2008) investigated the latter notion, and found results in support of the notion.
Raghunandan & Rama (2006) used a sample of 660 manufacturing firms with December 31,
2004 year-end, to investigate the relation between audit fees and internal control disclosures
under section 404. Raghunandan & Rama found audit fees increased by 43% between 2004 and
2003, for clients with material weakness disclosure. Raghunandan & Rama interpreted their
results as suggesting auditors were either not performing rigorous tests of internal control in
2003, or started internal control testing in 2004. As such, they concluded the additional work
needed for internal control testing is likely the cause for the increase in audit fees in 2004
especially in situations where the internal control system is plagued with material weaknesses.
Hogan & Wilkins (2008) investigated the relation between audit fees and internal control
deficiencies by using a matched sample of 284 internal control deficiency observations between
November 1, 2003 and November 30, 2004, to determine if audit firms follow the audit risk
model in reality. The results show significant increase in audit fees (proxy for audit effort) for
firms with internal control deficiencies. Also, the results indicate higher levels of inherent risk
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were associated with firms with internal control deficiencies. Hogan & Wilkins also found a
consistency with the audit risk model and auditor procedures.
Similarly, Patterson & Smith (2007) investigated how Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 might
affect the firm’s choices about internal control and auditor’s internal control testing. They argue
internal control tests only provide information about management’s choices relating to internal
control, and the tests do not provide evidence of fraud. Patterson & Smith (2007) suggest
evidence of fraud can be observed via substantive tests, and unattainable internal controls might
result in: (1) firms choosing weaker internal control systems, and (2) increases in audit costs. The
theoretical analysis suggests internal control tests are indicators of the possibility of fraud
through the assessment of the strength or weakness of the internal control system. The results
also show the amount of fraud decreased as internal control strength increased. However, in
situation where internal controls are strong, internal control testing increased up to a point after
which additional internal control testing did not provide additional value (i.e. new information
about fraud). Also, Patterson & Smith found audit costs including audit fees, increased with
increase in internal control testing due to Sarbanes-Oxley.
Discussion on Auditor litigation and internal control fraud in Post-SOX period
The studies discussed above suggest the characteristics of firms with internal control
issues resulting in fraud, in the post-SOX era are similar to those in the pre-SOX era studies.
Further, these studies show in response to the requirements of SOX, auditors adapted their
testing approach and increased audit procedures performed, which resulted in higher audit fees.
However, Dye (1993) suggests audit fees include a component for audit services plus a
component for the risk of auditor litigation. The latter component has not been extensively
addressed post Sarbanes Oxley, 2002. As such, this study contributes to existing literature on
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Sarbanes Oxley and risk of auditor litigation by investigating the effect of SOX 2002, Section
404 on auditor litigations, within the context of internal control related fraud.
In general, legal proceedings as implied by the procedural justice theory, are followed in
order to place the blame and accountability (or lack thereof) on an entity, and in so doing, to
compensate the victims. The primary victims in most legal proceedings of publicly listed firms
are the investors. Regulations, such as, the Sarbanes Oxley Act were enacted to protect investors
(US Congress 2002), and bodies, such as, the SEC enforces these regulations. Firms have been
made to pay fines and compensate investors for losses they experienced due to decision and
practices of management which are in adverse to acceptable business practices and regulations.
Auditors have also been held liable if the overriding perception is the auditors have failed in
carrying out their responsibilities, and knowingly or unknowingly aided firms in defrauding
investors. Since the primary intent of plaintiffs, in this case the SEC, is to enforce regulations,
and thereby protect investors, the risk is greater the SEC will sue any party (including auditors)
involved in financial statement frauds.
Further, prior literature and regulations have shown financial reporting fraud is more
sophisticated and more costly than misappropriation of assets. However, the latter by reason of
their nature tend to occur more frequently. Also, the accounts usually involved in
misappropriation of assets (e.g. cash, inventory), combined with the level of judgment needed in
testing these accounts makes them more auditable than accounts usually involved in financial
reporting fraud (e.g. revenue). As such, auditors would be expected to identify misappropriation
of assets easier than financial reporting fraud. In addition, auditors would be expected to
heighten their audit investigation when misappropriation of assets is noted, since it suggests a
lapse in the internal control system of a firm, and may possibly lead to the uncovering of
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financial reporting fraud. This view is implied by the attribution theory which suggests
evaluators would most likely believe comparable persons would not act differently given such
circumstances. Therefore, this study presents the following hypotheses:

H1: In the post-Sarbanes Oxley 404 period, auditors are more likely to
experience increased litigation due to internal control related fraud.
H2: In the post-Sarbanes Oxley 404 period, the likelihood of auditor
litigation is further increased in the presence of misappropriation of assets.

Accelerated filers
Part 240.12b-2 of the Code of Federal Regulations3, was amended in September 2002 to
include the definition of “accelerated filers.” Accelerated filers are firms with a market
capitalization of at least $75 million and non-accelerated filers are those with market
capitalization of less than $75 million. The SEC established the filing deadlines for annual and
quarterly reports based on whether a firm is an accelerated filer or a non-accelerated filer. In
addition, all publicly traded firms are required to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. With
respect to section 404, the compliance date for an accelerated filer is its first fiscal year ending
on or after November 15, 2004, and the compliance date for a non-accelerated filer is its fiscal
year ending on or after July 15, 2005. The different compliance dates were established because
the non-accelerated filers may experience difficulty in evaluating their internal control over

3

Title 17, Chapter II, Part 240-12b-2 of the Code of Federal Regulations. http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/textidx?c=ecfr&sid=afb2c8740477dfe9dd4fe4a45e081dbc&rgn=div8&view=text&node=17:3.0.1.1.1.2.66.106&idno=1
7 [Accessed January 15, 2012].
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financial reporting because these non-accelerated filers may not have as formal and wellstructured a system of internal control over financial reporting as larger companies.4
The accelerated filers have a minimum of $75 million in market capitalization (share
price times the number of outstanding shares), which suggests that either their share prices are
high, or the number of outstanding shares are high, or both are high. The accelerated filers, as
such, have access to capital sources and thus more resources. Prior literature (Krishnan &
Visvanathan, 2007; Doyle et al., 2007; Ashbaugh et al., 2007) has shown that profitable firms
have more resources to invest in internal control. Ge and McVay (2005) found a negative
association between firms’ resources and internal control ineffectiveness. Thus, these studies
suggest firms with more resources (assets, staff requirements, training, and access to capital) are
more likely to have more effective internal controls than firms with limited resources.
An effective internal control system at a minimum will possess components similar to
those of the COSO internal control framework. The components are: (1) control environment, (2)
risk assessment, (3) control activities, (4) information and communication, and (5) monitoring
(AICPA, 2004). Accelerated filers have more resources to invest in these components of internal
control framework and by doing so; they minimize the likelihood of the occurrence of internal
control fraud. In view of the above, this study argues that accelerated filers are more likely to
have well developed and effective internal controls, and are thus less likely to be associated with
auditor litigation due to internal control fraud. Therefore, this study presents the following
hypothesis:
H3: Non-accelerated filers are more likely to have higher auditor litigation
due to internal control related fraud than accelerated filers.

4

SEC.2004. Final Rule: Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports. www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8392.htm [Accessed October 1, 2010].
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Auditor’s internal control over financial reporting report
Under section 404(b) auditors are required to: (1) attest to the effectiveness of internal
control, and (2) report on the assessment of internal control and related disclosures made by a
firm’s management under section 404(a). To comply with this requirement, auditors have the
responsibility to design and perform audit procedures that will provide adequate evidential
matter about internal controls, and thus support the auditor’s opinions (Reffett, 2007; US
Congress 2002; Caplan, 1999; Matsumura & Tucker, 1992).
If the auditor’s opinion indicates the absence of control deficiencies, significant
deficiencies or material weaknesses, it implies the design, implementation and operations of the
internal controls are adequate to the extent the internal controls would allow management or
employees, in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect and
correct financial statements misstatements on a timely basis. Sarbanes Oxley made matters and
responsibilities relating to internal controls more prominent than any earlier regulation, and the
stakes are higher for all parties involved, including auditors.
An auditor’s report on internal control may be unqualified, a disclaimer, or adverse.
Below is an excerpt from the 2004 Annual Report (10-K)5 of Avery Dennison Corporation. The
report is unqualified.
“Also, in our opinion, management’s assessment, included in the accompanying
“Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting,” that the
Company maintained effective internal control over financial reporting as of January 1,
2005 based on criteria established in Internal Control – Integrated Framework issued by
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (“COSO”), is
fairly stated, in all material respects, based on those criteria. Furthermore, in our
opinion, the Company maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control over

5

Source: http://www.auditanalytics.com/0002/view-internal-controls.php?cfk=8818&is=1&aickey=4675 [Accessed:
December 23, 2011].
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financial reporting as of January 1, 2005, based on criteria established in Internal
Control – Integrated Framework issued by the COSO...”
The excerpt below is from the 2004 Annual Report (10-K)6 of Bally Total Fitness Holding
Corporation. The report is adverse.
In our opinion, management’s assessment that Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation
did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting as of December 31,
2004, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based on criteria established in Internal
Control — Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Also, in our opinion, because of the effect of the
material weaknesses described above on the achievement of the objectives of the control
criteria, Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation has not maintained effective internal
control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2004, based on criteria established
in Internal Control — Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).
The report about internal control over financial reporting is a core “product” of auditing
firms, and since auditors are required (section 201 of SOX 2002) and perceived to be
independent third parties, stakeholders are deemed to perceive such reports as more reliable and
valid than any similar reports from management. In view of the above, this study argues auditors
are most likely to be held accountable, and thus be exposed to litigation if their opinion on
internal controls over financial reporting is based on procedures that do not identify any type of
deficiencies, and yet internal control related fraud are noted subsequently to be occurring and
going undetected. This notion is implied by the attribution theory which suggests evaluators
would most likely believe comparable persons would act differently given circumstances, such
as, instances of internal control fraud. Therefore, this study presents the following hypothesis:

H4: Auditors are more likely to experience litigation due to internal control
fraud in the presence of an unqualified opinion for internal control over
financial reporting.

6

AuditAnalytics. http://www.auditanalytics.com/0002/view-internal-controls.php?cfk=770944&is=1& aickey=7182
[Accessed: December 23, 2011].
43

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 302
Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley, which became effective on August 29, 2002, requires
that: (1) management acknowledge their responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal
controls, (2) periodically evaluate the effectiveness of their firm’s internal controls, (3) conclude
and report on the effectiveness of their internal controls, and (4) disclose issues (significant
deficiencies and material weaknesses) with internal controls and fraud to their auditors.
The disclosures under Section 302 are voluntary, thus, management has a leeway about
what to disclose and what not to disclose. Moreover, auditors had no requirements under Section
302 beyond what may be considered typical, e.g. considering information (if any) management
communicates to them under Section 302, in planning and executing an audit. In which case, the
issues about Section 302 becomes questions of: (1) what management is disclosing or not
disclosing?, especially since prior literature (Francis et al., 2004 and 2005; Ogneva et al., 2007;
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007) has shown that firms with internal control issues are faced with a
higher cost of capital, and will thus have an incentive to make more voluntary disclosures about
internal control in order to reduce their cost of capital; and (2) what the auditor does with the
information disclosed to them especially since accounting and auditing standards have
encouraged that auditors skeptically examine information they receive in the course of an audit
(SAS 99). Management’s assessment of disclosure controls under Section 302 may show that
their firm’s internal control is ineffective as in the excerpt below from the 2004 Annual Report
(10-K)7 of Bally Total Fitness Holding Corporation.
“Management of the Company, with the participation of the Chief Executive Officer and
the Chief Financial Officer, evaluated the effectiveness of the design and operation of the
Company’s disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d7

Source: http://www.auditanalytics.com/0002/view-internal-controls.php?cfk=770944&is=1&mickey=7183
[Accessed: December 23, 2011].
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15(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the Exchange Act)), as of
December 31, 2004. Based upon this evaluation, the Chief Executive Officer and the
Chief Financial Officer have concluded that the Company’s disclosure controls and
procedures were not effective as of December 31, 2004 due to the material weaknesses in
internal control over financial reporting described below (Item 9A(b))…
Management of the Company is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate
internal control over financial reporting as defined in Rules 13a-15(f) under the
Exchange Act. Because of its inherent limitations, internal control over financial
reporting may not prevent or detect misstatements. Also, projections of any evaluation of
effectiveness to future periods are subject to the risk that controls may become
inadequate because of changes in conditions, or that the degree of compliance with the
policies or procedures may deteriorate. A material weakness represents a significant
deficiency (as defined in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s Auditing
Standard No. 2), or a combination of significant deficiencies, that results in more than a
remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial
statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. Management conducted an
assessment of the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting
as of December 31, 2004 based on the framework published by the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, Internal Control — Integrated
Framework. Management has identified the following material weaknesses in the
Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2004: 1.
Deficiencies in the Company’s control environment. The Company did not maintain an
effective control environment as defined in the Internal Control-Integrated Framework
published by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission…
These deficiencies resulted in a more than remote likelihood that a material misstatement
of the Company’s annual or interim financial statements would not be prevented or
detected, and contributed to the development of other material weaknesses described
below…”
The assessment may also indicate that internal control is effective as in the excerpt below from
the 2004 Annual Report (10-K)8 of Avery Dennison Corporation.
“The

Company maintains disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act
Rule 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) that are designed to ensure that information required to
be disclosed in the Company’s Exchange Act reports is recorded, processed, summarized
and reported within the time periods specified in the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s rules and forms, and that such information is accumulated and
communicated to the Company’s management, including its Chief Executive Officer and
Chief Financial Officer, as appropriate, to allow timely decisions regarding the required
disclosure.

8

Source: http://www.auditanalytics.com/0002/view-disclosure-controls.php?cfk=8818&is=1&dckey=12826
[Accessed: December 23, 2011].
45

In designing and evaluating the disclosure controls and procedures, management
recognizes that any controls and procedures, no matter how well designed and operated,
can provide only reasonable assurance of achieving the desired control objectives, and
management necessarily is required to apply its judgment in evaluating the cost-benefit
relationship of possible controls and procedures…
Based on the foregoing, the Company’s Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer have concluded that the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures are
effective to provide reasonable assurance that information is recorded, processed,
summarized and reported within the time periods specified in the SEC’s rules and forms,
and that such information is accumulated and communicated to the Company’s
management, including its Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, as
appropriate, to allow timely decisions regarding the required disclosure…”
Finally, firms may fail to issue a report under Section 302. The failure to issue a report under
Section 302 usually sends a negative signal to stakeholders.
Thus, this study argues that management’s assessment and disclosure regarding
ineffective internal control under Section 302 or the absence of management’s assessment and
disclosure related to internal control, will result in auditor litigation. This argument is based on
the attribution theory, since in both instances, evaluators would expect auditors to be motivated
to probe or investigate more the reasons for the ineffective internal control, and perform more
substantive procedures to reduce the overall audit risk (Ge and McVay, 2005). Therefore, this
study presents the following hypothesis:
H5: Firms with no or negative management voluntary disclosures concerning
internal control are positively associated with auditor litigation.

Recap of Hypotheses
The hypotheses are as follows:
H1: In the post-Sarbanes Oxley 404 period, auditors are more likely to
experience increased litigation due to internal control related fraud.
H2: In the post-Sarbanes Oxley 404 period, the likelihood of auditor
litigation is further increased in the presence of misappropriation of
assets.
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H3: Non-accelerated filers are more likely to have higher auditor litigation
due to internal control related fraud than accelerated filers.
H4: Auditors are more likely to experience litigation due to internal control
fraud in the presence of an unqualified opinion for internal control over
financial reporting.
H5: Firms with no or negative management voluntary disclosures concerning
internal control are positively associated with auditor litigation.

47

III Methodology

Research Design
This study seeks to determine the change in auditor litigation due to internal control
related fraud by using the pooled cross-sectional logit model. Using pooled cross-sectional from
different years has been determined to be an effective way of analyzing the effects of a new
policy, especially since the focus of pooled cross-sectional analysis is to examine how a key
relation has changed over time (Wooldridge, 2006). One assumption about pooled cross sectional
is observations are independent across time. However, this may not always be true.
In this study, for some firms, the observations of fraud occurrence are consecutive across
years. The fraud occurrence in each year is different, but is related to the fraud occurrence in a
preceding or subsequent year, immediately following that fraud occurrence. This suggests a nonindependence of such observations pooled across time and may imply a correlation of the error
terms within firms. To address this issue, observations are put in well-defined clusters. In this
study, observations are clustered by firms’ CIK numbers, and thus, the standard errors of the
estimates are robust to within cluster correlation.
The logit model is a form of the binary regression model, and this study uses the logit
model to investigate how the independent variables affect the probability of auditor litigation.
With a logit model, probability estimates are between the lower and upper bounds of 0 and 1,
and the probability is a nonlinear function of the independent variables (Long and Freese, 2006;
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Freeman 1978). According to Long and Freese (2006), since the model is nonlinear, the
magnitude of the change in the outcome (auditor litigation) probability that is associated with a given
change in one of the independent variables depends on the levels of all the independent variables. The

logit probability model is as below:
Pr (y = 1 | x) =

exp (  X )
1 + exp (  X )

Dependent variable
Auditor litigation
Bonner et al. (1998) used a multivariate model with two forms: (1) auditor litigation and
no litigation, and (2) auditor litigation and other litigation. This study focuses on auditor
litigation resulting from internal control related fraud. Thus, only one form of the model is
required, and as such a bifurcation of auditor litigation is not necessary. Auditor litigation will be
operationalized using a dummy variable, where (1) will represent presence of auditor litigation
and (0) will represent absence of auditor litigation.

Independent Variables
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, Section 404
Dummy variables are used to represent the periods as pre-Sarbanes-Oxley or postSarbanes-Oxley. Since Section 404 became effective November 15, 2004 for accelerated filers,
the first year for adoption of Section 404 begins November 15, 2004. As such, the periods
included in the study as post-Sarbanes-Oxley, Section 404, are all fiscal year-end from
November 15, 2004 to December 31, 2004, and all fiscal year-end periods for the calendar year
2005 and 2006 for accelerated filers. For non-accelerated filers, post-SOX 404 period begin July
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15, 2005. The pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period include all fiscal year-ends for the calendar years 2000
up to July 30, 2002. The period from the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (July 30,
2002) to the effective date of Section 404 (November 15, 2004) is the transition period for the
study. The transition period extends to July 14, 2005 for non-accelerated filers. Dummy variables
are included in the model to represent the transition and post-SOX 404 periods.
Internal control system related fraud
Internal control related frauds are either financial reporting fraud or misappropriation of
assets following SAS 99 (Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit). The sample
includes firms with internal control related frauds (specifically, firms that have financial
reporting fraud). As such, a dummy variable is included in the model for misappropriation of
assets. This variable does not represent firms that have only misappropriation of assets, but
rather, firms that have both financial reporting fraud and misappropriation of assets. As such, this
variable represents an interaction between financial reporting fraud and misappropriation of
assets. This variable equals one if both types of fraud (financial reporting fraud and
misappropriation of assets) occurred in a firm and zero if only financial reporting fraud occurred.
Accelerated filers
Dummy variables are used to represent whether a firm is an accelerated filer or a nonaccelerated filer. Firms are 1 if they are accelerated filers and 0, otherwise. Sarbanes Oxley
Section 404 became effective November 15, 2004 for accelerated filers, and the compliance date
for a non-accelerated filer is its fiscal year ending on or after July 15, 2005. Note the filing status
of a firm may change year after year, since it is dependent on a firm’s market value of
outstanding voting and non-voting shares as at the end of the second quarter of its fiscal year.
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Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley – Auditor’s report on internal control over financial report
Auditor’s opinion on firm’s internal control over financial reporting is included as a
dummy variable in the model. The variable equals one when the auditor’s report is unqualified
and equals zero when the report does not exist or is adverse. Since the effective date for this
report is November 15, 2004, there are no observations for periods prior to this date.
Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley – Management’s voluntary disclosures about internal control
The unaudited voluntary disclosures made by management about their firm’s internal
control are included as a dummy variable in the model. The variable equals one when
management makes disclosures and indicate internal control is effective, and equals zero when
no disclosure exists or management’s disclosure indicates ineffectiveness in the internal control.
Since the effective date for this report is August 2002, there are no observations for periods prior
to this date.

Control Variables
The research model includes a set of control variables that prior literature has shown to
have a positive or negative association with auditor litigation.
Auditor type
Prior research (Ashbaugh et al., 2007; Krishnan & Zhang, 2005; Heninger, 2001; Bonner
et al., 1998; Kothari et al., 1988) has suggested a relation between auditor litigation and auditor
type. Auditors are perceived as “deep pockets,” which implies they have resources to bear
litigation risk (Krishnan & Zhang, 2005; Carcello and Palmrose, 1994; Kothari et al., 1988).
Since the larger audit firms tend to have more resources and audit more publicly traded
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companies, whereas the smaller audit firms have lesser resources and audit more non-publicly
traded companies, these larger audit firms are expected to encounter more litigation than the
smaller audit firms. On the other hand, the regulators (e.g. SEC) are more concerned with
enforcing the rules that govern accounting and auditing, and ensuring investor protection. Their
motivation is not necessarily based on audit firms with “deep pockets,” but more of
responsibility and accountability. Following prior studies, this study includes a control variable
for auditor type.
Firm size
Prior literatures (Krishnan & Zhang, 2005; Heninger, 2001; Bonner et al., 1998; Carcello
& Palmrose, 1994) have shown firm size is associated with auditor litigation relating to financial
reporting and disclosures. The association between firm size and auditor litigation may exist
because larger firms most likely have more resources to fight legal cases if necessary. Also, firm
size has been shown to be associated with capital market (Krishnan & Zhang, 2005) which can
be an incentive to firms and auditors to disclose more information and thus minimize the chances
for litigation, including litigations due to fraud. The disclosures can be related to matters, such
as, segments, consolidation of operations, and foreign activities, as required by the Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles. These disclosures expose firms and auditors to litigation
(Heninger, 2001; Bonner et al., 1998; Carcello & Palmrose, 1994). Therefore, to remain
consistent with prior research, this study includes a control variable for firm size. And following
Krishnan & Zhang (2005), the natural log of total assets is used in the model.
Firm financial condition
According to Pratt & Stice (1994), “a client’s financial condition is related to the
probability of both capital provider losses and the auditor being held responsible for those
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losses.” Prior literatures (Palmrose & Scholz, 2000; Fureman, 1997; Carcello & Palmrose, 1994;
Palmrose, 1987) have shown associations between firms’ financial conditions and auditor
litigations. Declining financial conditions indicated by recurring losses and low ratios such as
return on assets, may motivate management to manage earnings, which can lead to material
misstatements, and also increase audit risk. Moreover, profitable firms have more resources to
invest in internal controls, and prior studies have shown an association between profitability and
internal controls (Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2007; Doyle et al., 2007; Ashbaugh et al., 2007). The
effect of firm financial condition is controlled in the same manner as in the Krishnan &
Visvanathan (2007) study. They measured profitability using return on asset (ROA), and
measured ROA as operating income scaled by average total assets.
Industry
Firms operate within industries and each industry has its attributes. Such attributes may
include dominance of intangible assets e.g. the financial industry. Prior literature (Bonner et al.,
1998; Martin et al. 1996; Palmrose, 1988) has shown industry affects auditor litigation. The
technology industry and the financial industry have been documented by these prior studies as
having higher litigation rates than other industries. Thus, to remain consistent with prior
research, this study includes control variables for the technology and financial industries. Two
sets of dummy variables are included following Bonner et al. (1998). The technology industry is
represented by 1 if a firm is in the technology industry and by 0, otherwise. The financial
industry is represented by 1 if a firm is in the financial industry and by 0, otherwise.
Stock Exchange
Prior literatures (Bonner et al., 1998; Carcello & Palmrose, 1994) have suggested the
stock exchange on which a firm is listed may be associated with auditor litigation. The
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requirements of stock exchanges differ and the differences in requirements may be the basis for
stock exchanges’ association with auditor litigation. Following prior studies, a dummy variable is
included in the model for Stock Exchange. Since, the New York Stock Exchange is the largest
and most popular in the U.S., the dummy variable for Stock Exchange is described in the model
as New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and takes on a value of 1 if a firm is listed in NYSE and
0, otherwise.
Firm Status
Prior studies suggested auditor litigation is higher for public companies in comparison to
non-public companies (Bonner et al., 1998; St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984). Sarbanes-Oxley
Section 404 focuses on public companies; therefore, non-public companies are not included in
the scope of this study. However, there exist differences within public companies relating to their
status as to whether or not they are closely held public companies. I define closely held public
companies as public companies with a controlling number of shares held by a few shareholders.
Therefore, this study controls for firm status (closely held or not) by including a dummy variable
that equals 1 if a firm is not closely held, and 0 otherwise.
Initial Public Offerings
Prior literatures indicate IPO firms are associated with earning management and fraud
(Palmrose, 2000; Krishnan 2005), and IPO firms are high litigation risk engagements (Colbert et
al., 1996). Therefore, this study includes a variable for IPO. This variable equals 1 if a firm is an
IPO firm, and 0 otherwise. To be considered as an IPO firm,: (1) a firm would have an IPO
within three years of the first year of fraud following Bonner et al. (1998), and (2) the SEC in its
AAERs would have associated (even marginally) the fraud with the initial public offering.
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Research model

Pr(AUDLIT = 1) = F( 0 +  1Trans +  2Post +  3MOA +  4MOATrans  5MOAPost  6Accel +
 7Aud404 +  8DC302   9AUD   10LNSIZE +  11FINCOND +  12Technology +  13Financial 

 14NYSE   15CloselyHeld   16IPO)
Where;
F (.)
AUDLIT
Trans

= the cumulative distribution function;
= indicator for auditor litigation;
= indicator variable equal to 1 for period between enactment of SOX, 2002 and effective
date for SOX 2002, Section 404, and zero otherwise;
Post
= indicator variable equal to 1 for period from effective date for SOX 2002, Section 404,
and zero otherwise;
MOA
= interaction variable for misappropriation of asset and financial reporting fraud. Variable
is equal to 1 if fraud in firm includes both FRF and MOA, and equal to zero if fraud is
FRF only;
MOATrans = interaction variable for misappropriation of asset and transitional period. Variable is
equal to 1 if MOA occurred in the transitional period and equal to zero otherwise;
MOAPost = interaction variable for misappropriation of asset and post period. Variable is equal to 1
if MOA occurred in the post period and equal to zero otherwise;
Accel
= indicator variable equal to 1 for accelerated filer, and zero otherwise;
Aud404
= indicator variable equal to 1 one when the auditor’s internal control report is
unqualified and equals zero when the report does not exist or is qualified;
DC302
= indicator variable equal to 1 when voluntary disclosures indicate internal control is

effective, and equals zero when no disclosure exists or disclosure indicates
ineffectiveness in the internal control;
AUD

= indicator variable for auditor, equal to 1 for Big 4 audit firm, and equal to zero
otherwise;
LNSIZE
= the natural log of total assets;
FINCOND = Financial condition, measured as return on assets.
Technology = indicator variable for technology industry, equal to 1 for firm in technology industry,
and equal to zero otherwise;
Financial
= indicator variable for financial industry, equal to 1 for firm in financial industry,
and equal to zero otherwise;
NYSE
= indicator variable for stock exchange, equal to 1 for NYSE, and equal to zero
otherwise;
Closely held = indicator variable for if firm is closely held, equal to 1 for not closely held, and equal to
zero otherwise;
IPO
= indicator variable for firm with initial public offering within three years of the fraud,
equal to 1 for IPO within three years of fraud, and equal to zero otherwise.
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IV Analysis

Sample Size Determination
The study includes the period 2000 to 2006, which represents the pre-SOX and post-SOX
periods. Data of firms that experienced internal control related fraud was obtained from
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) published in the SEC website. Each
AAER published by the SEC from 2000 to the second quarter of 2011 was examined. The search
was extended beyond 2006 because of the time lag between when frauds occur and when SEC
becomes aware of and announces them. The sample consists of observed U.S. listed firms with
internal control related frauds in any of the years 2000 to 2006. To be included in the sample, the
firm must (1) have an internal control related fraud enforcement by the Security and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC), (2) be publicly traded, (3) have 10-K reports on LexisNexis or SEC
website, and (4) have data reported in Audit Analytics, Compustat or Lexis Nexis.
Auditor litigation information and internal control related fraud information were
collected from the SEC website or Audit Analytics. Since auditors may be litigated in a year for
an audit or audits performed in previous years, in collecting data for the dependent variable,
auditor litigation, the focus was on the fiscal year period to which the auditor litigation relates
and not the year the SEC enforcement actions are reported on the SEC’s website. Similarly, since
internal control related fraud may occur in a year or years different from the year in which the
SEC issued an enforcement action relating to the internal control related fraud, this study uses
the actual period in which an internal control related fraud occurred instead of the year related
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enforcement action was reported by the SEC. For instance, if an internal control related fraud
occurred in 2004, but the related enforcement action was not released till 2007, the study used
2004 as the relevant period. Thus, the treatment for fraud occurrence and auditor litigation is
symmetrical. Therefore, data for the study was obtained from SEC enforcement actions released
from 2000 to 2011 (second quarter). Since SOX 2002 affected firms at the same time, an
inherent limitation of this study relates to the impossibility to identify both: (i) time specific
effects by using time dummies and (ii) the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley because Sarbanes Oxley
dummy is a linear function of time dummies.
The examination of the AAERs entailed identifying the period of the litigation (if the
period is not applicable to the study, it was omitted); and reading through the case to understand
the role of the auditor. For some of the fraud litigation cases, the auditor’s roles are included in
the same AAER with the firms. For other litigation cases where the auditor’s AAER was
separate from the firm’s AAER, the data was matched based on the firm name and the period of
the fraud. After examining the AAERs, the firm CIK numbers were obtained from Audit
Analytics, for firm identification in other databases. Subsequently, information about firms, such
as, auditor name for each year, fiscal year end, IPO year, Stock Exchange listing and industry
were obtained from Audit Analytics. Further, data about firms’ total assets and net income were
obtained from COMPUSTAT, using firms’ CIK (Central Index Key used on the SEC’s computer
system to identify corporations) numbers. Data relating to firm’s filing status (accelerated or
non-accelerated), and whether firms are closely held, were obtained from firms’ SEC filings.
From the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) from 2000 to
the second quarter of 2011, 261 firms (clusters) with fraud cases within the relevant period were
identified. Sixteen firms (clusters) were eliminated because the fraud cases were not related to

57

financial statement issues and 33 firms (clusters) were eliminated because they were not publicly
traded companies. Of the remaining 212 firms (clusters), 3 were deleted because their CIK
number was not identified. The final sample includes 209 firms (clusters) with internal control
fraud. Of these 209 firms, the SEC named the auditors of 67 firms as defendants. The remaining
142 firms did not have their auditors named as defendants. The determination of sample
described above is summarized in Table 1.
The final sample of 209 firms (clusters) comprises 629 observations pooled across the
period 2000 to 2006. Table 2 shows a breakdown of the observations with internal control related
fraud, by year. In 2000, 116 (18%) firms with internal control fraud were observed, and in 2001,
137 (22%) firms with internal control fraud were observed. In 2002 and 2003, 116 and 92 firms
with internal control fraud were observed, respectively. Seventy-six (12%) firms with internal
control fraud were observed in 2004. In 2005 and 2006, 57 and 35 firms with internal control
fraud were observed, respectively.
There is a decrease in observed instances of internal control fraud in the transition period
and the Post-SOX 404 period. This decrease may be partly attributed to the effect of firms’
preparations to comply with SOX 404 during the transition period and the subsequent
compliance with the requirements of SOX 404, after the effective date. Further, the decrease in
observed instances of internal control fraud in the transition period and the Post-SOX 404 period
may also be partly attributed to not observing internal control fraud cases not yet public
information. The unobservable instances of internal control fraud are due to the time lag between
the time of internal control fraud occurrence and the time of the SEC public designation of fraud.
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TABLE 1
Sample Determination

The table below provides a summary of how the final sample was determined.
Number
of firms

Firms with internal control fraud from AAERs

261

Deleted non-financial statement fraud firms

(16)

Deleted non-publicly traded firms

(33)

Deleted firms without identifiable CIK number

(3)

Final sample of fraud firms

209

Firms with auditors named as defendants by the SEC

67

Firms with auditors not named as defendants by the SEC

142

Final sample of fraud firms

209

TABLE 2
Distribution of Sample Observations with Internal Control Related Fraud, by Year

Years

Number of firms

Percentage

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

116
137
116
92
76
57
35

18%
22%
18%
15%
12%
9%
6%

Total

629

100%
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TABLE 3
Distribution of Sample Observations with Internal Control Related Fraud, by Industry

Industries

SIC Codes

Column A Column B Column C Column D
Entire
Pre-SOX
Transition
Post-SOX
Sample
(Obs = 629) (Obs = 269) (Obs = 235) (Obs = 125)

Agriculture

01

6

1

3

2

Construction

15 - 17

24

9

10

5

Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

60 - 68
20, 26 - 28, 30, 33 38
10, 13, 14

72

33

25

14

261

107

101

53

54

11

20

23

Manufacturing
Mining

18

7

8

3

127

63

47

17

Transportation, Communications, Electric, and Gas

53 - 56, 59
72 - 76, 78 - 80, 87,
89
42, 45, 48, 49

47

30

12

5

Wholesale Trade

50, 51

20

8

9

3

Retail Trade
Services

60

The 629 observations include a total of nine industries based on the two-digit standard
industrial classification (SIC). Table 3 reports a breakdown of the final sample of firms by
industry. Column A shows 261 (41.49%) of the firms in the final sample are manufacturing
firms. The services industry has the second largest percentage (20.19%) and includes 127 firms.
The third largest industry is Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, represented by 72 firms
(11.45%). The Mining industry includes 54 firms (8.59%), while Transportation,
Communication and Utilities represent 7.47% (47 firms) of the final sample. Other industries
represented in the final sample are Construction with 24 firms (3.82%), Wholesale Trade with 20
firms (3.18%), Retail Trade with 18 firms (2.86%), and Agriculture with 6 firms (0.95%). The
distribution of the final sample across industries as shown in Column A is consistent across
Column B, the pre-SOX 404 period; Column C, the transitional period, and Column D, the postSOX 404 period.

Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics by auditor litigation are shown in Table 4. Column A reports
the means and standard deviations of variables for firms with fraud and auditor litigation and
column B shows the corresponding summary statistics for firms with fraud and no auditor
litigation. As shown in Table 4, of the 67 firms with fraud and auditor litigation (Column A),
34.3% of the instances were observed in the transition period (Trans), whereas of the 562 firms
with fraud and no auditor litigation (Column B), 37.7% of the instances were observed in the
transition period (Trans). This suggests a marginal difference in the mean of firms with auditor
litigation in comparison to firms without auditor litigation in the transition period (Trans).
Further, 20.9% of the 67 instances of firms with auditor litigation (Column A) were
observed in the Post-SOX 404 period (Post), and 19.8% of the 562 instances of firms without
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auditor litigation (Column B) were observed in the Post-SOX 404 period (Post). This result
also indicates a marginal difference in the mean of firms with auditor litigation in comparison to
firms without auditor litigation in the Post-SOX 404 period (Post).
However, as shown in Table 4, there exists a large difference in the mean of
misappropriation of assets (MOA) between firms with auditor litigation and firms without
auditor litigation. Of the 67 firms with auditor litigation (Column A), 47.8% of the instances
involved misappropriation of assets (MOA), whereas of the 562 firms without auditor litigation
(Column B), 16.9% involved misappropriation of assets (MOA). This result suggests auditor
litigation is more likely when both financial reporting fraud and misappropriation of assets occur,
relative to when only financial reporting fraud occurs.
Of the 67 firms with auditor litigation (Column A), 11.9% are accelerated filers
(Accel), whereas of the 562 firms without auditor litigation (Column B), 46.1% are accelerated
filers (Accel). There exists a large difference in the mean of firms with auditor litigation and the
mean of firms without auditor litigation, which suggests auditor litigation, is less likely for
accelerated filers relative to non-accelerated filers. Further, of the 67 firms with auditor
litigation, 52.2% had a Big 4 as an auditor (AUD), whereas 87.7% of the 562 firms without
auditor litigation had a Big 4 as an auditor (AUD). This result suggests auditor litigation is more
likely when a firm has a non-Big 4 as their auditor, relative to when a firm has a Big 4 as their
auditor.
As shown in Table 4, a large difference exists in the mean of SIZE between firms with
auditor litigation and firms without auditor litigation. The firms with auditor litigation have a
mean of approximately 683 million dollars in total assets (SIZE) whereas the firms without
auditor litigation have a mean of about 270 million dollars in total assets (SIZE), thus suggesting
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auditors of larger firms are more likely to be litigated relative to auditors of smaller firms.
Further, the firms with fraud showed negative return on assets (FINCOND). However, there is a
large difference in the mean of return on assets (FINCOND) between firms with auditor
litigation (Column A) and firms without auditor litigation (Column B). The firms with auditor
litigation have a mean of 36.5% whereas the firms without auditor litigation have a mean of
2.6%, thus suggesting the weaker a firm’s financial condition, the more likely auditor
litigation will occur.
Similarly, a significant difference exists in the mean of NYSE between firms with auditor
litigation and firms without auditor litigation. The firms with auditor litigation have a mean of
20.9% whereas the firms without auditor litigation have a mean of 50.9%, suggesting auditors of
firms listed in the NYSE are less likely to be litigated relative to auditors of firms not listed in
the NYSE. In addition, of the 67 firms with auditor litigation, 43.3% are closely held firms,
whereas 18.7% of the 562 firms without auditor litigation are closely held. The large difference
in the mean of closely held firm between firms with auditor litigation and firms without auditor
litigation suggests auditor litigation is more likely when a firm is closely held, relative to when a
firm is not closely held.
Table 5 reports the summary statistics, by period, for the observations included in the
study. Column A shows the summary statistics for the entire 629 observations. Column B shows
the summary statistics for the observations before the enactment of SOX 2002, Section 404.
Column C shows the summary statistics for the observations during the transition period.
Column D shows the summary statistics for the observations after the effective date of SOX
2002, Section 404. The statistics reported in column B (pre-SOX period), column C (transition
period), and column D (post-SOX period) are consistent with the statistics reported in column A.
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Column A shows the summary statistics for the entire period, 2000 - 2006. There were
instances of auditor litigation in 10.7% of the observations. Accelerated filers (Accel) represent
42.4% of the observations, and 20.2% of the observations had misappropriation of assets
(MOA). The percentage of observations with unqualified opinion on internal control over
financial reporting (Aud404) was 10.5% and 41.8% of the observations were firms with
management’s voluntary disclosures on internal control representing effective internal controls
(DC302).
With respect to the control variables, 83.9% of the firms with fraud had a Big 4 firm
(AUD) as their auditor, 47.7% of the firms with fraud are listed in NYSE, and 2.4% of the
observations were IPO firms. Closely held firms represent 21.3% of the observations. Further,
15.6% of the firms were in the technology industry, while 11% were in the financial industry.
The firms with fraud show negative return on assets (FINCOND), and they were mostly larger
firms.
Column B shows the summary statistics for the 269 observations before the enactment of
SOX 2002, Section 404. There were instances of auditor litigation in 11.2% of the observations,
and 20.1% of the observations had misappropriation of assets (MOA) in the Pre-SOX period
observations. The mean for firms with an unqualified opinion on internal control over financial
reporting (Aud404) was zero. Since auditors were not required to attest and report on internal
control over financial reporting till the Post-SOX 404 period, the mean value of zero is expected
for the variable, unqualified opinion on internal control over financial reporting (Aud404), in the
Pre-SOX 404 period.
Accelerated filers (Accel) have a mean value of zero in the Pre-SOX period observations.
The differentiation for accelerated filers was established in September 2002, which was during
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the transition period. The means for accelerated filers (Accel) in the transition period (Trans) and
in the Post-SOX 404 (Post) were 66.8% (Column C) and 88% (Column D), respectively. Based
on the date the differentiation for accelerated filers was in effect, the significant variation in the
percentages for accelerated filers in the Pre-SOX period on the one hand, and the transition
period (Trans) and Post-SOX 404 period (Post) on the other hand is expected.
Further, the filing status of firms can change if the market value of their outstanding
voting and non-voting shares as at the end of the second quarter of their fiscal year changes. As
the market value of the shares increase, a firm can change from a non-accelerated filer to an
accelerated filer and vice versa, if the market value of the shares decreases. Hence, the increase
in the mean of accelerated filers (Accel) from 66.8% in the Transition period (Trans) to 88% in
the Post-SOX 404 period (Post) is reasonable.
There were no observations of firms with management’s voluntary disclosures on internal
control (DC302) during the Pre-SOX period. The requirements under Section 302 relating to
management voluntary disclosures on internal control became effective in the transition period
(Trans). Based on the effective date of August 29, 2002, management voluntary disclosures in
the Pre-SOX period were none existent. Therefore, the zero mean for the Pre-SOX period
observations and the means of 77% (Column C) in the transition period (Trans) and 65.6%
(Column D) in the Post-SOX 404 (Post) are reasonable.
With respect to the control variables, 87.4% of the firms with fraud had a Big 4 firm
(AUD) as their auditor, 44.6% of the firms with fraud are listed in NYSE, and 4.1% of the
observations were IPO firms. Closely held firms represent 20.4% of the observations. Further,
16.7% of the firms were in the technology industry, while 11.9% were in the financial industry.
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The firms with fraud in the Pre-SOX 404 observations show negative return on assets
(FINCOND) and were mostly larger firms.
Column C shows the summary statistics for the 235 observations during the transition
period. There were instances of auditor litigation in 9.8% of the observations. Misappropriation
of assets (MOA) was noted in 19.6% of the transition period observations. Accelerated filers
(Accel) represent 66.8% of the transition period observations. The percentage of observations
with unqualified opinion on internal control over financial reporting (Aud404) was 1.2% and
77% of the observations were firms with management’s voluntary disclosures on internal control
representing effective internal controls (DC302).
For the control variables, 85.1% of the firms with fraud had a Big 4 firm (AUD) as their
auditor, 48.9% of the firms with fraud are listed in NYSE, and 1.2% of the observations were
IPO firms. Closely held firms represent 22.1% of the observations. Further, 14.5% of the firms
were in the technology industry, while 9.8% were in the financial industry. The firms with fraud
in the transition period (Trans) sample show negative return on assets (FINCOND), and they
were typically larger firms.
Column D shows the summary statistics for the 125 observations after the effective date
of SOX 2002, Section 404. There were instances of auditor litigation in 11.2% of the
observations. Misappropriation of assets (MOA) was noted in 21.6% of the Post-SOX 404 period
observations. Accelerated filers (Accel) represent 88% of the Post-SOX 404 period observations.
The percentage of observations with unqualified opinion on internal control over financial
reporting (Aud404) was 50.4% and 65.6% of the observations were firms with management’s
voluntary disclosures on internal control representing effective internal controls (DC302).

66

With respect to the control variables, 74.4% of the firms with fraud had a Big 4 firm
(AUD) as their auditor, 52% of the firms with fraud are listed in NYSE, and less than 1% of the
Post-SOX 404 period (Post) observations were IPO firms. Closely held firms represent 21.6% of
the observations. Further, 15.2% of the firms with fraud were in the technology industry, while
11.2% were in the financial industry. The firms with fraud in the Post-SOX 404 period (Post)
show marginal positive return on assets (FINCOND) and they were typically larger firms.
However, there is a large difference in the mean of SIZE for these firms in the Post-SOX 404
period (Column D), in comparison to the mean of SIZE of the firms in the Pre-SOX 404 period
(Column B) and the transition period (Trans).
The pairwise correlations for the variables in this study are shown in Table 6. The
correlations9 equal to or greater than 0.4 and significant at the p<.01 level are discussed below.
The variable representing management’s voluntary disclosures relating to internal control under
Section 302 of Sarbanes Oxley Act (DC302) is positively correlated with the transitional period
(Trans). The pairwise correlation value is 0.5513. Section 302 became effective on August 29,
2002, which is within the transitional period. Since, DC302 (management’s voluntary disclosures
relating to internal control) reflects compliance with the requirement, the positive correlation
with Trans is not unexpected.
Post-SOX 404 period (Post) is positively correlated (0.4590) with accelerated filers
(Accel). The positive correlation between Post-SOX 404 period (Post) and accelerated filers

9

Significant correlations involving interaction variables and the individual component variables are not explained.
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Table 4
Descriptive Statistics By Auditor Litigation
Column A
Firms with auditor litigation
Variable
Trans
Post
MOA
Accel
Aud404
DC302
AUD
SIZE*
LNSIZE
FINCOND
Technology
Financial
NYSE
CloselyHeld
IPO
N

Mean
0.343
0.209
0.478
0.119
0.045
0.299
0.522
683.171
5.952
-0.365
0.179
0.119
0.209
0.567
0.075

Std. Dev
0.478
0.410
0.503
0.327
0.208
0.461
0.503
3370.000
2.703
1.551
0.386
0.327
0.410
0.499
0.265
67

Column B
Firms without auditor litigation
Mean
0.377
0.198
0.169
0.461
0.112
0.432
0.877
270.211
7.201
-0.026
0.153
0.109
0.509
0.813
0.018

Std. Dev
0.485
0.398
0.375
0.499
0.316
0.496
0.328
1160.000
1.085
0.766
0.360
0.311
0.500
0.390
0.132
562

* SIZE is in millions of dollars.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics By Period
Column A
Overall
Variable
AUDLIT
MOA
Accel
Aud404
DC302
AUD
SIZE*
LNSIZE
FINCOND
Technology
Financial
NYSE
CloselyHeld
IPO

Mean
0.107
0.202
0.424
0.105
0.418
0.839
314.199
7.068
-0.062
0.156
0.110
0.477
0.787
0.024

N

Std. Dev
0.309
0.402
0.495
0.307
0.494
0.367
1550.000
1.403
0.887
0.363
0.313
0.500
0.410
0.153
629

Column B
Pre-Sox 404
Mean
0.112
0.201
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.874
363.983
7.083
-0.061
0.167
0.119
0.446
0.796
0.041

Std. Dev
0.315
0.401
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.333
1880.000
1.559
0.860
0.374
0.324
0.498
0.404
0.198
269

Column C
Transition
Mean
0.098
0.196
0.668
0.012
0.770
0.851
318.126
7.033
-0.101
0.145
0.098
0.489
0.779
0.013

Std. Dev
Mean
0.298
0.112
0.398
0.216
0.472
0.880
0.113
0.504
0.422
0.656
0.357
0.744
1370.000 199.680
1.388
7.100
0.880
0.008
0.353
0.152
0.298
0.112
0.501
0.520
0.416
0.784
0.113
0.008
235

* SIZE is in millions of dollars.
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Column D
Post-Sox 404
Std. Dev
0.317
0.413
0.326
0.502
0.477
0.438
975.000
1.035
0.960
0.360
0.317
0.502
0.413
0.089
125

TABLE 6
Correlations matrix
AUDLIT
AUDLIT
Trans
Post
MOA
MOATrans
MOAPost
Accel
Aud404
DC302
AUD
LNSIZE
FINCOND
Technology
Financial
NYSE
CloselyHeld
IPO

1.0000
-0.0216
0.0088
0.2371***
0.1010**
0.1303***
-0.2131***
-0.0678*
-0.0837***
-0.2982***
-0.2749***
-0.1177***
0.0222
0.0107
-0.1853***
-0.1853***
0.1149***

Trans

1.0000
-0.3846***
-0.0119
0.3637***
-0.1636***
0.3806***
-0.2323***
0.5513***
0.0245
-0.0191
-0.0337
-0.0237
-0.0292
0.0192
-0.0155
-0.0561

Post

1.0000
0.0175
-0.1399***
0.4252***
0.4590***
0.6485***
0.2402***
-0.1294***
0.0115
0.0392
-0.0052
0.0037
0.0429
-0.0036
-0.0517

MOA

1.0000
0.5585***
0.4210***
-0.1115***
-0.0430
0.0313
-0.2331***
-0.1817***
-0.0889**
-0.0632
-0.0118
-0.1711***
-0.1155***
0.0252

Note 1: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Note 2: Using a cut-off of 0.4 (absolute), all significant correlations equal to or greater than 0.4 (absolute) are in bold.
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MOATrans

MOAPost

1.0000
-0.0595
0.0306
-0.0962**
0.2447***
-0.1433***
-0.1342***
-0.1222***
-0.0870*
-0.0595
-0.0848**
-0.0626
-0.0439

1.0000
0.1038**
0.1834***
0.1067**
-0.2278***
-0.0627
-0.0528
-0.0477
-0.0241
-0.0923**
-0.1197***
-0.0331

TABLE 6 (cont.)
Correlations matrix
Accel
AUDLIT
Trans
Post
MOA
MOATrans
MOAPost
Accel
Aud404
DC302
AUD
LNSIZE
FINCOND
Technology
Financial
NYSE
CloselyHeld
IPO

1.0000
0.3672***
0.6153***
0.1829***
0.1768***
0.1325***
0.0302
0.0073
0.2103***
0.1797***
-0.0710**

Aud404

DC302

1.0000
0.3829***
0.0367
0.0821**
0.0613
-0.0040
0.0624
0.0989**
0.0768*
-0.0535

1.0000
0.0020
0.0062
0.0091
0.0180
0.0119
0.0746*
0.0238
-0.0691**

AUD

LNSIZE

1.0000
0.4611***
0.2772***
0.0924**
0.0427
0.3570***
0.2801***
-0.0168

1.0000
0.1755***
-0.0741*
0.2052***
0.4393***
0.2995***
-0.0937**

Note 1: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Note 2: Using a cut-off of 0.4 (absolute), all significant correlations equal to or greater than 0.4 (absolute) are in bold.
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FINCOND

1.0000
0.0205
0.0393
0.1581***
0.1708***
-0.0057

TABLE 6 (cont.)
Correlations matrix
Technology
AUDLIT
MOA
Trans
Post
MOATrans
MOAPost
Accel
Aud404
DC302
AUD
LNSIZE
FINCOND
Technology
Financial
NYSE
CloselyHeld
IPO

1.0000
-0.1508***
-0.2523***
-0.0120
0.1627***

Financial

NYSE

1.0000
0.0926**
0.1578***
-0.0549

1.0000
0.3647***
-0.1075***

Note 1: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Note 2: Using a cut-off of 0.4 (absolute), all significant correlations equal to or greater than 0.4 (absolute) are in bold.
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CloselyHeld

1.0000
-0.0205

IPO

1.0000

(Accel) is consistent with the requirement for accelerated filers to comply with Section 404 on
their first fiscal year ending on or after November 15, 2004. In addition, auditor’s report on
internal control over financial reporting (Aud404) is positively correlated (0.6485) with PostSOX 404 period (Post). This reflects the requirement of Section 404(b) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act
2002, which specifies that “with respect to the internal control assessment required by subsection
(a), each registered public accounting firm that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer
shall attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the management of the issuer” (US
Congress, 107 H.R. 3763). Hence, the positive correlation between Aud404 and Post is
reasonable.
The variable representing management’s voluntary disclosures relating to internal control
under section 302 of Sarbanes Oxley Act (DC302) is positively correlated with accelerated filers
(Accel). The pairwise correlation value is 0.6153. Under Section 302, management makes
voluntary disclosures about the internal control, and prior research (Francis et al., 2004 and
2005; Ogneva et al., 2007; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007) has shown the financial market
responds to more voluntary disclosures. Since, accelerated filers (Accel) are heavily traded in the
financial market, the positive correlation between management’s voluntary disclosures relating
to internal control (DC302) and accelerated filers (Accel) is reasonable.
Auditor type (AUD) is positively correlated with size (LNSIZE). The pairwise correlation
value is 0.4611, and it indicates a high percentage of the large publicly traded companies are
audited by the Big 4 audit firms. Also, size (LNSIZE) is positively correlated (0.4393) with
NYSE, and indicates large publicly traded companies are generally listed on the NYSE. This
appears reasonable since the assets and equity test is one of the options to satisfy the NYSE
financial standards requirement in listing process. The assets and equity test requires firms have:
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(i) at least $150,000,000 in global market capitalization, and (ii) at least $75,000,000 in total
assets together with at least $50,000,000 in stockholders’ equity10.
Results for Hypotheses
This study investigates the change in auditor litigation in the post-Sarbanes Oxley period,
and evaluates not only the direction of the association (sign) and the significance of the test
statistic, but also, the change in the probability of auditor litigation (AUDLIT) when one of the
variables changes by one unit (Long and Freese, 2006)11. Table 7 presents the results of the
cross-sectional logit analysis.
The Wald Chi-squared statistic as shown in the bottom of Table 7 is statistically
significant at the p-value < 0.01 level. The estimated coefficient (1.3615) and the marginal effect
of the transition period (Trans) are each positive and statistically significant at the p<.05 level.
The estimate of the marginal effect for the transition period (Trans) dummy variable is 0.1123
meaning, relative to the Pre-SOX period, probability of auditor litigation increases by 11.23
percentage points in the transition period (Trans). Also, the estimate of the marginal effect for
the Post-SOX 404 period (Post) dummy variable is 0.2113 meaning, relative to the Pre-SOX
period, probability of auditor litigation increases by 21.13 percentage points in the Post-SOX 404
period. The coefficient (1.9884) for Post-SOX 404 period (Post) is positive and statistically
significant at the p<0.01 level. The, marginal effect of Post-SOX 404 is statistically significant at
the p<0.05 level, and the results for Post-SOX 404 period support the first hypothesis (H1) which

10

Source: Section 1: The Listing Process; Listed Company Manual. http://nysemanual.nyse.com [Accessed January
15, 2012].
11

The average marginal effect of an interaction variable is non-existent. The average marginal effects that exist are
those of the underlying components of the interaction variable.
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is, in the post-Sarbanes Oxley 404 period, auditors are more likely to experience higher litigation
due to internal control related fraud.
The estimated coefficient for misappropriation of assets (MOA) is 1.1496. The
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. The marginal effect of
misappropriation of assets (MOA) is positive and statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. The
estimate of the marginal effect for misappropriation of assets (MOA) dummy variable is 0.091
meaning, relative to instances where only financial reporting fraud occurs, the probability of
auditor litigation (AUDLIT) increases further by 9.1 percentage points when both financial
reporting fraud and misappropriation of assets occur.
The estimated coefficients for the variables, misappropriation of asset in transition period
(MOATrans) and misappropriation of asset in Post-SOX 404 period (MOAPost) are negative and
statistically insignificant. Though the coefficient of misappropriation of assets (MOA) is positive
and statistically significant, the results for the interaction variables, misappropriation of asset in
transition period (MOATrans) and misappropriation of asset in Post-SOX 404 period
(MOAPost), suggest misappropriation of assets (MOA) has a smaller effect on the probability of
auditor litigation in the transition (Trans) and Post-SOX 404 (Post) periods, than on the
probability of auditor litigation in the pre-SOX 404 period. The result for misappropriation of
asset in Post-SOX 404 period (MOAPost) appears not to support the second hypothesis (H2),
which is, the probability of auditors being litigated for internal control related fraud in the PostSOX 404 period increasing in the presence of misappropriation of assets.
The result indicates accelerated filers (Accel) have an estimated coefficient of -2.0748,
which is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. The marginal effect of accelerated filers
(Accel) is negative and statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. The estimate of the marginal
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TABLE 7
Results from Cross-Sectional Logit Model
The table reports the coefficient estimates and z-statistics from the cross-sectional logit regression of the
research model. A positive coefficient indicates a higher probability of auditor litigation. The table also
reports the marginal effect, which is the change in the probability of auditor litigation given a change in
an independent variable.

Variable

Expected
Sign

Estimated
Coefficient

Trans

?

1.3615

Post

+

1.9884

MOA

+

1.1496

MOATrans

+

-0.3308

MOAPost

+

-0.1407

Accel

-

-2.0748

Aud404

+

-0.1640

DC302

-

-0.9128

AUD

?

-0.7029

LNSIZE

+

-0.1908

FINCOND

+

-0.0011

Z- Statistic
(p-value)
2.45**
(0.014)
2.79***
(0.005)
2.68***
(0.007)
-0.39
(0.695)
-0.15
(0.878)
-3.71***
(0.000)
-0.18
(0.861)
-1.87*
(0.061)
-1.69*
(0.092)
-1.79*
(0.073)
-0.01
(0.988)

Marginal
Effect
0.1123
0.2113
0.0911
a
a
-0.1361
-0.0116
-0.0610
-0.0597
-0.0141
-0.0001

Z- Statistic
(p-value)
1.98*
(0.047)
2.31**
(0.021)
2.71***
(0.007)
a
a
-3.66***
(0.000)
-0.18
(0.855)
-2.00**
(0.046)
-1.47
(0.142)
-1.86*
(0.062)
-0.01
(0.988)

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
a
Estimating margin effects for an interaction variable is not possible. Marginal effect estimate of an interaction variable is the
marginal estimate of the component variables. Hence, marginal effect is not reported for any interaction variable.

76

TABLE 7 (Cont.)
Results from Cross-Sectional Logit Model
Variable

Expected
Sign

Estimated
Coefficient

Technology

?

0.4222

Financial

?

0.7337

NYSE

?

-0.0831

CloselyHeld

-

-0.2886

IPO

+

1.2924

Constant

?

-0.5713

N
Wald Chi-squared statistic
p-value

629
93.51
0.0000

Pseudo R2

0.2409

Z- Statistic
(p-value)

Marginal
Effect

Z- Statistic
(p-value)

1.05
(0.296)
1.51
(0.130)
-0.21
(0.831)
-0.80
(0.424)
2.24**
(0.025)
-0.76
(0.446)

0.0339

0.98
(0.327)
1.31
(0.189)
-0.21
(0.831)
-0.76
(0.446)
1.72*
(0.085)

0.0635
-0.0061
-0.0224
0.1326

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

effect for accelerated filers (Accel) is -0.1361 and means, relative to non-accelerated filers,
probability of auditor litigation (AUDLIT) decreases by 13.61 percentage points for accelerated
filers. The result provides support for the third hypothesis (H3) which is, non-accelerated filers
are more likely to have higher auditor litigation due to internal control related fraud than
accelerated filers.
The estimated coefficient and the marginal effect of auditor’s unqualified opinion for
internal control over financial reporting (AUD404) are negative and statistically insignificant.
This result does not provide support for the fourth hypothesis (H4) that auditors are more likely
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to experience litigation due to internal control fraud in the presence of an unqualified opinion for
internal control over financial reporting. However, the result shows the estimated coefficient and
marginal effect of management voluntary disclosures relating to internal control (DC302) are
negative and statistically significant at p<.1 level and p<.05 level, respectively.
The estimate of the marginal effect for management voluntary disclosures relating to
internal control (DC302) is -0.0610 and implies, relative to firms with management voluntary
disclosures relating to internal control indicating ineffective internal controls, that the probability
of auditor litigation (AUDLIT) decreases by 6.1 percentage points for firms with management
voluntary disclosures relating to internal control indicating effective internal controls (DC302).
This result supports the fifth hypothesis (H5).
The findings show the coefficient for auditor type (AUD) is negative, and the statistical
significance is marginal at the p<.1 level. The marginal effect for auditor type (AUD) is negative
and statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. Additionally, the result show the
estimated coefficient and marginal effect of size (LNSIZE) are negative and statistically
significant at the p<.1 level. The estimate of the marginal effect of firm size (LNSIZE) implies a
1% increase in firm size (LNSIZE) results in a 1.4% decrease in the probability of auditor
litigation (AUDLIT).
The result also shows a positive coefficient for initial public offering firms (IPO). The
estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the p<.05 level. The marginal effect for initial
public offering firms (IPO) is positive and statistically significant at the p<.1 level. The estimate
of the marginal effect for initial public offering firms (IPO) is 0.1326 and implies, relative to
non-IPO firms, the probability of auditor litigation (AUDLIT) increases by 13.26 percentage
points for initial public offering firms (IPO).
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The estimated coefficients and marginal effects for the technology industry (Technology)
and the financial industry (Financial) are all positive and statistically insignificant at the
conventional levels. Similarly, the results show the estimated coefficients and marginal effects
for financial condition (FINCOND), stock exchange (NYSE) and closely held firms
(CloselyHeld) are negative and statistically insignificant at the conventional levels. The results
suggest financial condition (FINCOND), industry, stock exchange listing and firms being closely
held, may not affect the likelihood of auditor litigation.
Overall, auditor litigation seems to be lower for accelerated filers (Accel) and firms with
management’s voluntary disclosures indicating effective internal control (DC302). The odds
ratio for the dummy variable accelerated filers (Accel) in the Post-SOX 404 period is 0.92
(=exp(-2.0748)*exp(1.9884)), meaning auditor litigation is about 8% lower for accelerated filers.
Also, in the Post-SOX 404 period, the odds ratio for firms with management’s voluntary
disclosures indicating effective internal control (DC302) is 2.93 (=exp(-0.9128)*exp(1.9884)).
The odds ratios in the Post-SOX 404, for accelerated filers (Accel) and firms with management’s
voluntary disclosures indicating effective internal control (DC302) are much lower than the odds
ratio of 7.3 (=exp(1.9884)), for firms that are neither accelerated filers nor firms with
management’s voluntary disclosures indicating effective internal control.
Supplementary Analysis
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in July 2002, and though the effective date for Section
404 was in November 2004, firms and their auditors began making changes to comply with the
requirements of SOX 404 long before the effective date. An indication of the effect of these
changes to comply with the requirement of SOX 404 is observed in the decrease in instances of
internal control fraud in the transition and Post-SOX 404 periods (see Table 2). Therefore, this
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TABLE 8
Supplementary Analysis
The table reports the coefficient estimates and z-statistics from the cross-sectional logit regression. A
positive coefficient indicates a higher probability of auditor litigation. The table also reports the marginal
effect, which is the change in the probability of auditor litigation given a change in an independent
variable.

Variable

Expected
Sign

Estimated
Coefficient

After

+

1.4408

MOA

+

1.1438

MOAAfter

+

-0.1939

Accel

-

-1.8310

Aud404

+

0.2443

DC302

-

-0.9955

AUD

?

-0.8235

LNSIZE

+

-0.1846

FINCOND

+

0.0060

Z- Statistic
(p-value)
2.76***
(0.006)
2.66***
(0.008)
-0.27
(0.791)
-3.33***
(0.001)
0.34
(0.737)
-2.06**
(0.040)
-2.01**
(0.045)
-1.76*
(0.078)
0.08
(0.935)

Marginal
Effect
0.1132
0.0942
a
-0.1214
0.0193
-0.0673
-0.0720
-0.0137
0.0004

Z- Statistic
(p-value)
2.46**
(0.014)
2.77***
(0.006)
a
-3.35***
(0.001)
0.32
(0.752)
-2.18**
(0.029)
-1.71*
(0.088)
-1.83*
(0.067)
0.08
(0.935)

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
a
Estimating margin effects for an interaction variable is not possible. Marginal effect estimate of an interaction variable is the
marginal estimate of the component variables. Hence, marginal effect is not reported for any interaction variable.
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TABLE 8 (Cont.)
Supplementary Analysis
Variable

Expected
Sign

Estimated
Coefficient

Technology

?

0.4452

Financial

?

0.7145

NYSE

?

-0.0686

CloselyHeld

-

-0.3371

IPO

+

1.3222

Constant

?

-0.4908

N
Wald Chi-squared statistic
p-value

629
96.98
0.0000

Pseudo R2

0.2367

Z- Statistic
(p-value)

Marginal
Effect

Z- Statistic
(p-value)

1.15
(0.252)
1.46
(0.145)
-0.18
(0.859)
-0.94
(0.345)
2.21**
(0.027)
-0.67
(0.506)

0.0360

1.07
(0.285)
1.27
(0.204)
-0.18
(0.859)
-0.89
(0.372)
1.69*
(0.091)

0.0618
-0.0051
-0.0264
0.1371

*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.

section presents the result of the logit analysis for an alternative specification, when the period
after Sarbanes Oxley is defined to include both the transitional period and the Post-SOX 404
period. By investigating this alternative specification, this study is able to determine the effect of
SOX 2002 since its enactment on auditor litigation.
The period after Sarbanes Oxley is represented by the variable “After.” The Wald Chisquared statistic as shown in the bottom of Table 8 is statistically significant at the p-value <
0.01 level. The estimated coefficient (1.4408) and the marginal effect of the period after
Sarbanes Oxley (After) are positive and statistically significant at the p<.01 level and p<.05
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level, respectively. The estimate of the marginal effect for the period after Sarbanes Oxley
(After) is 0.1132 meaning, relative to the period before Sarbanes Oxley, the probability of
auditor litigation increases by 11.32 percentage points, in the period after the enactment of
Sarbanes Oxley. This result is consistent with the estimate of Post-SOX 404 period (Post) in the
research model.
Additionally, Table 8 shows the estimated coefficient of misappropriation of assets
(MOA) is positive and statistically significant at the p<0.05 level. The estimate of the marginal
effect for misappropriation of assets (MOA) dummy variable is 0.0942 and means, relative to
instances where only financial reporting fraud occurs, the probability of auditor litigation
(AUDLIT) increases further by 9.42 percentage points when both financial reporting fraud and
misappropriation of assets occur. This result is consistent with the estimate obtained for
misappropriation of assets (MOA) in the research model.
Further, accelerated filers (Accel) have an estimated coefficient of -1.8310, which is
statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. The marginal effect of accelerated filers (Accel) is
negative and statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. The estimate of the marginal effect for
accelerated filers (Accel) is -0.1214 and means, relative to non-accelerated filers, probability of
auditor litigation (AUDLIT) decreases by 12.14 percentage points for accelerated filers. This
result is also consistent with the estimate of accelerated filers (Accel) in the research model.
The results show the estimated coefficient and the marginal effect of auditor’s
unqualified opinion for internal control over financial reporting (AUD404) are positive and
statistically insignificant. The estimated coefficient and marginal effect are in the expected
direction suggesting a possible increase in the probability of auditor litigation (AUDLIT) in the
presence of unqualified opinion for internal control over financial reporting (AUD404). Though
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the signs of the estimated coefficient and marginal effects in the alternative specification are in
the opposite direction to the signs obtained in the research model, all the estimates are
statistically insignificant at the conventional levels.
The result shows the estimated coefficient (-0.9955) and marginal effect of management
voluntary disclosures relating to internal control (DC302) are negative and statistically
significant at p<.05 level. The estimate of the marginal effect for management voluntary
disclosures relating to internal control (DC302) is -0.0673 and implies, relative to firms with
management voluntary disclosures relating to internal control indicating ineffective internal
controls, that the probability of auditor litigation (AUDLIT) decreases by 6.73 percentage points
for firms with management voluntary disclosures relating to internal control indicating effective
internal controls (DC302). This result is also consistent with the estimate of management
voluntary disclosures relating to internal control indicating effective internal controls (DC302) in
the research model.
Additionally, as indicated in Table 8, the marginal effect for auditor type (AUD) is
negative and statistically significant at the p<.1 level. The estimate of the marginal effect for
auditor type (AUD) is -0.0720 and means, relative to non-Big 4 audit firms, the probability of
auditor litigation (AUDLIT) decreases by 7.2 percentage points for Big 4 audit firms. This result
is not consistent with the result obtained from the research model.
The result show the estimated coefficient and the marginal effect of firm size (LNSIZE)
are negative and statistically significant at the p<.1 level. The estimate of the marginal effect of
firm size (LNSIZE) suggests a 1% increase in firm size (LNSIZE) results in a 1.4% decrease in
the probability of auditor litigation (AUDLIT). This result is also consistent with the estimate of
firm size (LNSIZE) in the research model.
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The result also shows a positive coefficient for initial public offering firms (IPO). The
estimated coefficient is statistically significant at the p<.05 level. The marginal effect for initial
public offering firms (IPO) is positive and statistically significant at the p<.1 level. The estimate
for the marginal effect for initial public offering firms (IPO) is 0.1371 and implies, relative to
non-IPO firms, the probability of auditor litigation (AUDLIT) increases by 13.71 percentage
points for initial public offering firms (IPO). This result is also consistent with the estimate of
initial public offering firms (IPO) in the research model.
The estimates for the variables of interest in the alternative specification are fairly
consistent with the estimates obtained from the research model. Therefore, the conclusions about
the variables of interest appear to be robust to the alternative specification.
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V. Conclusions

The current study examines the change in auditor litigation due to internal control fraud,
using 629 observations of fraud firms across the period 2000 through 2006. Prior studies have
examined auditor litigation, but few, if any, have investigated the change in auditor litigation
since Sarbanes Oxley section 404 became effective. Generally, the study hypothesizes that
auditor litigation due to internal control fraud increased in the post-Sarbanes Oxley 404 period.
The results of the study shows in the Post-SOX 404 period, the likelihood of auditor
litigation due to internal control fraud increases. The study provides no support for further
increases in the likelihood of auditor litigation when both misappropriation of assets and
financial reporting fraud occur, in the Post-SOX 404 period. In addition, the result suggests the
likelihood of auditor litigation decreases for accelerated filers, and similarly, the findings
indicate a decrease in the likelihood for auditor litigation for firms with management voluntary
disclosures representing effective internal control. The study provides no support for an increase
in the likelihood of auditor litigation in the presence of unqualified auditor’s opinion on internal
control over financial reporting, when fraud occurs.
Regulators should find these results relevant when evaluating the effect of Sarbanes
Oxley 2002, Section 404 especially, as it relates to corporate responsibilities, fraud deterrence,
and accountability. Moreover, the results of this study suggest a continued increase in the
enforcement of accountability for Sarbanes Oxley 2002, Section 404 through SEC’s oversight
activities.
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External auditors should find the results of this study relevant, as it further emphasizes
the need for professional skepticism, and adequate attention to warning signs and fraud risks.
The increase in the likelihood of auditor litigation related to internal control frauds, as reflected
in the results of this study should motivate auditors towards performing audits that are thorough
even though they may involve additional substantive testing and cost.
This study makes several contributions to literature. First, the study extends the literature
on Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 by investigating its effect on auditor litigation. The results of the
study provide some insight to how auditor litigation due to internal control fraud has changed
since the effective date of Sarbanes-Oxley 202, Section 404. Second, procedural justice theory, is
used in framing the theoretical structure of this study, and prior to this current study, very little
prior literature have applied procedural justice theory in the investigation of auditor litigation.
Third, the current study indicates the need for external auditors to reassess their current audit
procedures to ensure loopholes in the assessment of the client’s internal control over financial
reporting are eliminated.
Limitations
Data for this study is limited by time since investigation of some of the fraud litigation
cases observed (particularly the post-SOX 2002, Section 404 cases) are still on going. Also, from
a review of the data, it appears there exists a considerable time lapse between the occurrence of
fraud and the time firms and their auditors or firms or their auditors are litigated by the SEC. As
such, not all instances of fraud that occurred within the relevant period of this study have been
made public by an SEC enforcement.
Nonetheless, this study notes the statute of limitations exists for bringing lawsuits against
firms, auditors, or both. According to Section 804 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 – Statute of
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Limitation for Securities Fraud - “a claim of fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in
contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, may be brought not later than the earlier of: “(1) two years after the
discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or (2) five years after such violation.”12
Therefore, since data for this study was collected from 2000 to 2011 (second quarter), it appears
the period covered is at the tail end of the five years after a violation, particularly for violations
which occurred in 2006.
The sample for this study includes firms listed in the U.S. exchanges. Some of these firms
trade in foreign markets, and the requirements of stock exchanges across the globe differ much
like accounting and auditing standards differ across borders. Though some countries have
established their country’s SOX, which for the most part are adaptations of the U.S. SOX, the
results of this study may still not be broadly globe generalizable.
Certain events occurred around the enactment of Sarbanes Oxley 2002, which may have
an impact on the behavior of auditors during the research investigation time period. For instance,
one of the then Big 5 audit firms collapsed with the Enron debacle. The effect (e.g. improvement
in audit procedures, more training) of the collapse of the Big 5 firm on other audit firms cannot
be easily measured, and was not captured in the model of this study.
Opportunities for Future Research
The current study examines the change in auditor litigation due to internal control fraud
in the Post-SOX 2002, Section 404 period. The focus was on auditors being litigated by the
SEC. This study did not investigate penalty imposed by the SEC on auditors or audit firms for
sub-standard audits. Some prior studies have focused on monetary penalty imposed by the SEC,
12

One hundred seventh congress of the United States of America, at the second session begun and held on the
twenty-third day of January, two thousand and two.
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but have not addressed the non-monetary penalties imposed by the SEC to a great extent. Future
research in the change in non-monetary penalty (i.e. length of time license is suspended, jail
time) imposed by the SEC on auditors for internal control fraud should be explored.
Investigating the change in non-monetary penalty will provide the following benefits: (1)
determining if the change in auditor litigation reported in the results of this study are associated
with the change in penalty (monetary or non-monetary); and (2) determining which penalty type
(monetary or non-monetary) is a more effective deterrent, especially since the non-monetary
penalty are uninsurable unlike the monetary penalty.
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